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Does Strong Compatibilism Survive Frankfurt Counter-Examples?

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REFERENCES

  • Campbell, Joseph Kiem (1997): ‘A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibility’, Philosophical Studies.

  • Fischer, John Martin (1994): The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, Oxford: Blackwell.

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  • Frankfurt, Harry G. (1969): ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 66, 826–839. Reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About. All citations are to the latter.

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  • Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971): ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy 68, 5–20. Reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About. All citations are to the latter.

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  • Frankfurt, Harry G. (1988): The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, New York: Cambridge University Press.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Ithaca College, Ithaca, NY, 14850, USA

    Michael S. Mckenna

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  1. Michael S. Mckenna
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Mckenna, M.S. Does Strong Compatibilism Survive Frankfurt Counter-Examples?. Philosophical Studies 91, 259–264 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004232828687

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