Abstract
In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
On some views, all free acts have mental acts as components. I wish to remain neutral about this issue.
Voluntarism appears to have problems explaining responsibility for omissions, when omissions are understood as intentional failures to act. The challenge that Smith raises for voluntarism in her paper shares some similarities with puzzles about responsibility for omissions. This is not a topic I can explore here, though the resolution I shall offer in closing is one that might be fitted for a proper treatment of omissions as well.
The point I will set out is fully and impressively developed with striking results in Manuel Vargas’s recent, “The Trouble with Tracing,” (2005). Smith mentions the skeptical concern I shall develop here, but does not discuss it at all. She simply notes that, “few, if any, of us can claim to bear full or even substantial responsibility for how we became the particular people we are” (29).
Smith also mentions this defense of her view (28-9), but here too she does not develop the point. For a further treatment of it, see McKenna (2004).
References
Adams, R. (1985). Involuntary Sins. The Philosophical Review, 93 (1), 3–31.
Blum, L. (1980). Friendship, altruism, and morality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Forester, E. M. (1910). Howard’s end. New York: Penguin Books, Inc.
Levy, N. (2005). The good, the bad, and the blameworthy. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1(2), 1–16.
McKenna, M. (2004). Responsibility and globally manipulated agents. Philosophical Topics, 32, 169–92.
Oakley, J. (1992). Morality and the emotions. London: Routledge.
Scanlon, T. M. (1988). The significance of choice. In S. McMurrin (Eds.), The tanner lectures on human values, vol. 8 (pp. 149–216). Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sher, G. (2005). Kantian fairness. Philosophical Issues, 15, 179–192.
Sher, G. 2006. Out of control, Ethics 116 (2), 285–301.
Slote, M. (1992). From morality to virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smart, J. J. C. (1961). Free-will, praise, and blame. Mind, 70 (279), 291–306.
Smith A. 2006 (forthcoming). “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment.” Philosophical Studies (All references are to a prepublication draft).
Vargas, M. (2005). The trouble with tracing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIX, 269–91.
Wallace, R. J. (1996). Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Watson, G. (1996). Two faces of responsibility. Philosophical Topics, 24(2), 227–248.
Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
For helpful comments on this paper, I would like to thank Randy Clarke, John Martin Fischer, Joshua Knobe, Eddie Nahmias, Dana Nelkin, Dan Speak, and Manuel Vargas. I am especially indebted to Angela Smith.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
McKenna, M. Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility. Philos Stud 139, 29–37 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9100-5
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9100-5