Abstract
Husserl’s writings on sociality have received increasing attention in recent years. Despite this growing interest, Husserl’s reflections on the specific role of communication remain underexplored. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by reconstructing the various ways in which Husserl draws systematic connections between communication and communalization. As will become clear, Husserl’s analysis converges with much more recent ideas defended by Margaret Gilbert and Naomi Eilan.
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Notes
Stawarska (2009, pp. ix-x, 32, 34, 49).
Stawarska (2009, p. 30).
Stawarska (2009, pp. 30, 75).
For a detailed account of Husserl’s early theory of communication, in particular the difference between indications and expressions, see Averchi (2018).
Zahavi (2001).
Husserl (2008, p. 682).
Husserl (1973c, p. 603).
Husserl (1973b, p. 170–171).
Husserl (1973c, p. 475).
Husserl (1973c, p. 471).
Husserl (2019, p. 338, translation modified).
Husserl (1973b, p. 167).
Husserl (1973c, p. 471).
Ibid., p. 472–473.
Ibid., p. 477.
Husserl (1973b, p. 184).
Although Husserl doesn’t specify this further, it seems clear that one’s intention to communicate with the other need not be explicitly articulated by means of a separate speech act but is often implicitly conveyed by means of one’s body posture, one’s gaze and voice being directed towards the addressee.
Reinach (2012, p. 19).
Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid., p. 28. See also Salice and Uemura (2018).
Husserl (1973c, p. 476). Theunissen (1984, p. 295) once argued that one of the important differences between Husserl and Buber was that whereas Husserl’s focus was on the perceptual manifestation of the other, Buber considered language “the home of the Thou.” But since Husserl (1973b, p. 307) takes mutual communicative address to constitute the core of what it means to relate second-personally to one another, the difference between the two might have to be located elsewhere.
Eilan (2020, p. 8).
Eilan (ms., p. 11).
Eilan (2020, p. 7).
Eilan (ms. p. 12).
Husserl (1973c, p. 475).
Ibid., p. 476.
Husserl (1973c, p. 476).
Husserl (1973c, p. 477).
Husserl (1973a, p. 473; 1973c, p. 396). We find a comparable position in Gilbert, who writes “Usually we think of volunteering as involving public avowal, ‘I will help clean up after the service’ someone says at a church meeting. This is a typical case of volunteering. ‘I’m afraid I don’t have time to help at the election this year’ says someone rejecting the position of volunteer. But it is one of my crucial contentions that at the time of disclaiming the ability to help, this last person is a volunteer of sorts. Without any explicit preamble, she has volunteered her help in sustaining in existence a small, temporary ‘community,’ that constituted by herself and the person or persons she is talking to” (Gilbert 1989, p. 410).
Husserl (1973c, p. 477).
Husserl (1973b, pp. 167–168). Husserl’s example is admittedly underdescribed since he doesn’t explicitly mention whether the subject who follows the pointing gesture looks back to the first subject in order to acknowledge that they are now both attending to the same object. For further discussions, see e.g., Gallagher (2010), Campbell (2005), Peacocke (2005).
Husserl (1970, pp. 328–329).
Husserl (1970, pp. 328–329).
Husserl (1989, p. 203).
Ibid., p. 201.
Ibid., p. 201.
Ibid., p. 203.
Ibid., p. 201.
Husserl (1973b, p. 197).
Husserl (1989, pp. 191–192).
Husserl (1973c, p. 19).
Husserl (1973b, p. 403).
Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., p. 170.
Husserl (1962, pp. 514–515).
Husserl (2002, p. 135).
Husserl (1973b, p. 218).
Husserl (1973b, p. 200–201).
Husserl (1973c, p. 144).
Husserl (1973a, p. 108).
Husserl (1973b, p. 220).
Ibid., p. 182.
Gilbert (1989, p. 214).
Ibid., p. 216.
Gilbert (1989, p. 218).
Gilbert (1989, p. 218).
Gilbert (2011, p. 279).
In addition to the types we have discussed, Husserl also distinguishes, for instance, life-communities, communities of purpose, natural and artificial communities etc., see Husserl (1973a, p. 108).
There are striking similarities between Husserl and Gilbert, but there are also important differences. Whereas Husserl frames the communicative connectedness in terms of an intentional intertwinement, Gilbert argues that it involves a joint commitment (2014, p. 329), and even claims that people who engage in this minimal form of communication must “have the concept of joint commitment” (2014, p. 333), which is something she takes most adult human beings to possess (2014, p. 333). For a discussion of why this requirement might be too demanding, see León and Zahavi (2019).
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Acknowledgements
We are indebted to helpful comments from Felipe León, Thomas Szanto and John Drummond. The work has been supported by funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 832940) and from the Carlsberg Foundation (Grant ID: CF18-1107).
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Meindl, P., Zahavi, D. From communication to communalization: a Husserlian account. Cont Philos Rev 56, 361–377 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-023-09601-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-023-09601-7