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Mirror neurons as a conceptual mechanism?

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Abstract

The functional role of mirror neurons has been assessed in many different ways. They have been regarded, inter alia, as the core mechanism of mind reading, the mechanism of language understanding, the mechanism of imitation. In this paper we will discuss the thesis according to which MNs are a conceptual mechanism. This hypothesis is attractive since it could accommodate in an apparently simple way all the above-mentioned interpretations. We shall take into consideration some reasons suggesting the conceptualist characterization of MNs, as well as some possible replies. We shall figure out how an argument for the conceptualist hypothesis could be deployed, focusing on the notion of off-line processes, which turns out to be the crucial (and maybe problematic for mirror processes) property necessary to ascribe concept possession. Our conclusion will be that, despite of there being some evidence for the conceptualist account, the issue cannot be definitely settled, because there are both experimental shortages and conceptual difficulties. In particular, there are (at least) three distinct senses in which MNs can be regarded as a conceptual mechanism, but we shall argue that only one of these interpretations can be defended.

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Notes

  1. This thesis is clearly consistent with the above-mentioned claim that MN allow to recognise motor intentions.

  2. This does not imply that monkeys are definitely not able to work off-line. Zuberbühler et al. (1999) have shown that Diana monkeys have representations of alarms stocked in long-term memory. Diana monkeys have different alarm calls for two different sources of danger: eagles and leopards. Those alarms appear to be genuinely referential, not only emotional alarms. Indeed, if an eagle alarm call is generated and then a monkeys hears a leopard growling, then a leopard alarm is produced. On the contrary, if an eagle shrieks after an eagle call, no further alarm is generated, as monkeys are not surprised by any new relevant information. This ‘alarm specifically referring to eagles’ persists for at least 5 min. This allows Diana monkeys to ‘inhibit’ the action ordinarily triggered by the external stimulus, thereby realising what we called ‘output-side detachment’. On the other hand, it is hard to establish whether the representation can also be scheduled top-down.

  3. It is worth pointing out that, according to our account, the property of being off-line (rather than on-line) is attributed to a global process or ability, that is, to a macro-process individuated at the level of the whole organism. Therefore, when we wonder whether a neural mechanism, such as the activity of MNs, is off-line, what we are asking is really whether the neural mechanism is used in a ‘global’ off-line process. In other words, the off-line rather than on-line character of the neural mechanism is inherited, so to speak, from the corresponding character of the macroprocess or ability.

  4. There is no reason for thinking, however, that the output side detachment must be based on some inhibition mechanism. It is enough that the loop perception–action should be short-circuited in some way or another.

  5. It is relatively standard to regard imagery as a kind of reasoning process, at least in spatial domains (see e.g. Johnson-Laird’s Mental Models and several other authors). Through an imagery process, one is able to draw new information, as, for instance, when one realises that an appropriate combination of a ‘J’ and a ‘D’ yields an umbrella.

  6. The primary motor area is Brodmann area 4, which is the homolog, or at least the analog, of the F1area in the macaque brain.

  7. To be precise, the TMS was induced simultaneously with the end of the second syllable of the verb (for instance, ‘cuci*va la gonna’ [‘he was sewing the skirt’]), that is, between the root and the suffix.

  8. Different kinds of movement can be subsumed under one and the same concept. For example, one can grasp something with the hand as well as with the mouth. Therefore the degree of somatotopic organization should be further qualified.

  9. The idea is that the alleged abstract concepts are metaphorical displacements of sensorimotor concepts. See e.g. Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999.

  10. See also Neininger and Pulvermüller (2003).

  11. The same can be said of the data collected in Aziz-Zadeh (2008), who report cases in which motor impairments stemming from ‘anterior’ (frontal) lesions affect action understanding. These data do not test linguistic understanding.

  12. In this experiment participants were asked to use/observe/imagine two different kinds of pliers, requiring two different kinds of movement: normal pliers, which require to close the hand (in order to grasp the object), and reverse pliers, which require to open the hand. These details are not relevant for our point.

  13. See Csibra (2007) and Jacob (2007) for a discussion of the role of the context in determining the motor intentions subsequent to the perceived action.

  14. Yet, it seems not impossible to conceive an experimental task in which logically-related MNs could be activated in absentia of the stimulus, thus realising off-line inferences. Note that we are talking here of motor (prior) intention: we are not committed to the thesis that MNs are constitutively involved in determining the prior intention in a psychological sense, that is, by doing a sort of mind reading. This is a different issue.

  15. This does not rule out the possibility that pieces of sensorimotor representations are activated during the semantic processing of the word ‘government’. The point is that such activations play no role in understanding.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Richard Davies, Pierre Jacob, Diego Marconi and two anonymous referees for their helpful advices on earlier drafts.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici, Università del Piemonte Orientale, Via G. Ferraris 116, 13100, Vercelli, Italy

    Cristina Meini

  2. Dipartimento di Lettere, Arti e Multimedialità, Università di Bergamo, Via Pignolo 123, 24121, Bergamo, Italy

    Alfredo Paternoster

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  1. Cristina Meini
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  2. Alfredo Paternoster
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Correspondence to Cristina Meini.

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This is a fully co-authored paper. Both the authors are jointly responsible for each section.

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Meini, C., Paternoster, A. Mirror neurons as a conceptual mechanism?. Mind Soc 11, 183–201 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-012-0106-0

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