Skip to main content
Log in

Intentional action and wayward causal chains: The problem of tertiary waywardness

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Bibliography

  1. Brand, M.: 1984, Intending and Acting (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).

    Google Scholar 

  2. Chisholm, R.: 1964, ‘The descriptive element in the concept of action’, Journal of Philosophy 61, pp. 613–625.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Davidson, D.: 1973, ‘Freedom to act’, in T. Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London), pp. 137–156.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Frankfurt, H.: 1978, ‘The problem of action’, American Philosophical Quarterly 15, pp. 157–162.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Goldman, A.: 1970, A Theory of Human Action (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs).

    Google Scholar 

  6. Mele, A.: 1983, ‘Akrasia, reasons and causes’, Philosophical Studies 44, pp. 345–368.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Searle, J.: 1983, Intentionality (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).

    Google Scholar 

  8. Thalberg, I.: 1984, ‘Do our intentions cause our intentional actions?’ American Philosophical Quarterly 21, pp. 249–260.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Mele, A.R. Intentional action and wayward causal chains: The problem of tertiary waywardness. Philosophical Studies 51, 55–60 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353962

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353962

Keywords

Navigation