Abstract
This paper is a critique of the current version of Derk Pereboom’s “disappearing agent argument” against event-causal libertarianism. Special attention is paid to a notion that does a lot of work in his argument—that of settling which decision occurs (of the various decisions it is open to the agent to make at the time). It is argued that Pereboom’s disappearing agent argument fails to show that event-causal libertarians lack the resources to accommodate agents’ having freedom-level control over what they decide. The connection between the disappearing agent argument and the problem of present luck is explored, as is the connection between settling which decision one makes and luck. Pereboom’s disappearing agent argument also is distinguished from another argument with the same name that targets intentional action itself.
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Notes
In the case of Pereboom 2017b, I use paragraph numbers in citations. The printed version of that article was not available.
In his 2014 book, Pereboom says that his disappearing agent argument does not target “agency” itself and rather targets basic desert moral responsibility (32).
Event-causal libertarians have the option of distinguishing between directly and indirectly free actions. For example, they can claim that A is a directly free action only if its proximate causes do not deterministically cause it and claim as well that an action that is deterministically caused by its proximate causes may be indirectly free, provided that the agent earlier performed some relevant directly free action or actions from which it inherits its freedom. For example, if Martin’s noteworthy action, A, is deterministically proximately caused by something that includes elements of a character that was shaped in significant part by directly free actions Martin performed, A may be deemed indirectly free. Henceforth, by “free” I mean “directly free.”.
I am grateful to Randy Clarke for comments on a draft of this paper.
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Mele, A.R. On a Disappearing Agent Argument: Settling Matters. J Ethics 28, 351–360 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-023-09438-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-023-09438-5