Abstract
As the title “Doing without Concepts” suggests Edouard Machery argues that psychologists should stop using the notion of concept because: (1) the only interesting generalizations about concepts can be drawn at the level of types of concepts (prototypes, exemplars and theories) and not the level of concept in general; and (2) competences such as categorization or induction can rely on these different types of concepts (there is not a one to one correspondence between type of concept and competence). I try to make the point that these two elements are not wholly compatible. If several types of concepts are used to perform a given competence (point (2)), then they have to be well regulated (e.g. which type is activated when, which type wins in case of conflict). These regulatory mechanisms can then be the basis for interesting generalizations (against point (1)). On the other hand, it is possible that point (1) applies to competences as well: that there are no interesting generalizations to be drawn about categorization in general. In which case different types of categorization are likely to be underlain by different types of concepts (against point (2)). Even though the arguments laid out in the book are forceful and well supported by empirical evidence, a more positive thesis might have been both more successful rhetorically and more interesting scientifically.
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Notes
The problems of finding a good level of description for competences (or functions) and the trouble this can cause for evolutionary psychologists have been described by Sterelny and Griffiths (1999, p. 328ff), who call it the grain problem.
It could be argued that competences cannot be natural kinds in the first place on ontological grounds. Still, the argument here mostly bears on the place of a given construct within a scientific theory (i.e. is the construct of ‘concept’ useful within psychology), and this applies equally well to competences.
Machery discusses hybrid theories of concepts, theories in which the different conceptual processes related to a category (prototype, exemplar, theory) are regulated by the necessity to yield consistent output (p. 64). He argues that consistency is not required and is in fact often absent between these processes. But that does not mean that other types of regulatory mechanisms, that might tend to yield consistent answers without looking specifically for them, would make it useless to talk of the set of processes they regulate as a unified concept. After all, minds are, presumably, natural kinds even though it is not clear that they have a specific device to avoid drawing inconsistent conclusions.
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Mercier, H. How to cut a concept? Review of doing without concepts by Edouard Machery. Biol Philos 25, 269–277 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-009-9186-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-009-9186-6