Abstract
“Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations” (call it “TP-PR,” this journal 2014 79.3, 545–566) argues that core teleosemantics, particularly as defined in Millikan (Language, thought and other biological categories, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1984, J Philos 86(6):281–297, 1989, White queen psychology and other essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, Philosophical perspectives, Ridgeview Publishing, Alascadero, 1996, Varieties of meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004–2008), seems to imply that all descriptive representations are at the same time directive and that directives are at the same time descriptive, hence that all representations are pushmi-pullyu representations. A pushmi-pullyu representation is at once indicative and imperative, telling both what the case is and what to do about it. The usefulness at all of the notion of a pushmi-pullyu representation is then questioned. I have recently found several new papers, dissertations, discussions, in which TP-PR is treated as definitive. However, the conclusions of TP-PR rest on misunderstandings of my position, so although the date is late, clarification seems still to be in order. I will indicate a few significant corrections that need to be made to TP-PR’s description of my position (originally called “biosemantics”) and explain central features of biosemantics that are omitted in TP-PR’s description of basic teleosemantics and which are incompatible with the main argument and conclusions of TP-PR. I will try to clarify and explain the value of the notion of a pushmi-pullyu representation.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Imagine a neuroscientist with an elegant new theory of what the hippocampus does and how it works who doesn’t try to publish because he doesn’t know how this system, in all of its intricate detail, would have evolved.
A reviewer suggests that it is possible to read “SENDER RECEIVER (1)” in a way that allows for a number of different receivers. Still, the skeleton argument requires that they all react to R in the same way.
Gibsonians are said to be representation phobic.
Contrary to TP-PR, biosemantics does not hold that there are such things as “basic representations” nor does it claim that all simple representations are pushmi-pullyus. The most primitive representations may, however, be pushmi-pullyus. Speculation that many or all nonhuman animals are pushmi-pullyu creatures is the speculation that, unlike humans, their lives largely consist in the following of rather complex affordances that they encounter either by chance or by purposefully following affordances leading to further affordances. Very little in the way of planning fills their mental lives. For this reason they may have no reason to store purely factual beliefs. This theme is expanded at some length in (Millikan 2004).
References
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Millikan, R. (1989). Biosemantics. The Journal of Philosophy, 86(6), 281–297.
Millikan, R. (1993). White queen psychology and other essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Millikan, R. (1996). Pushmi-pullyu representations. In J. E. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives (Vol. IX, pp. 185–200). Alascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.
Millikan, R. (2004). Varieties of meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Millikan, R. (2008). Biosemantics. In B. McLaughlin (Ed.), The Oxford handbook in the philosophy of mind (pp. 394–406). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [not the same as the 1989 J. Phil. article with the same name listed above].
Millikan, R. (2017). Beyond concepts: Unicepts, language and natural information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Skyrms, B. (2010). Signals: Evolution, learning, and information. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Millikan, R.G. Comment on Artiga’s “Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations”. Erkenn 88, 409–417 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00354-w
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00354-w