Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'usetheoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical challenge. © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2000.
CITATION STYLE
Miller, A. (2000). Horwich, meaning and Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Philosophical Quarterly, 50(199), 161–174. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00177
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