Abstract
Those working within the tradition of Humean psychology tend to mark a clear distinction between beliefs and desires. One prominent way of elucidating this distinction is to describe them as having different “directions of fit” with respect to the world. After first giving a brief overview of the various attempts to carry out this strategy along with their flaws, I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is misleading and ought to be abandoned. It fails to take into account the actual complexity of the roles played by belief and desire and forces us to look for a single, fundamental contrast between these two that is unlikely to be found.
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Notes
The agreed upon locus classicus for this way of marking the difference is Anscombe’s Intention (1957).
For a defense of this claim, see Sobel and Copp (2001, p. 46).
I. L. Humberstone draws attention to this problem. See Humberstone (1992, p. 65).
There are cases of desire that seem to fit Humberstone’s model. For example, if I desire to cross the street, ordinarily I also intend to do so. Nevertheless, this is a contingent matter and so the point still stands that Humberstone has not here identified an attitude constitutive of having a desire.
Sobel and Copp anticipate the objection that what Sue really desires is to root for the winning team and reply that, “Even if this is what she desires at some level, she can only satisfy this desire by actually forming a desire that a particular team win” (2001, p. 48).
I am not here meaning to advance any substantive view about the nature of the good. Rather, the point is that if one thinks it makes sense to denominate desires good or bad (not exactly an extreme position) then there must be some standard apart from the desire itself in virtue of which it earns this status.
Our desires, in order to issue in action, always require the use of our reason in determining our circumstances and what will actually satisfy the passion in question. This, in turn, requires various beliefs.
Zangwill (1998) intends to “explicate the distinction” between belief and desire (p. 173), and Humberstone (1992) declares, obscurely, “The interest throughout is on saying, clearly and non-metaphorically, what direction of fit is, and in what difference in respect of direction of fit consists” (p. 60). In carrying out these tasks, however, both authors seem to give accounts of what they take to constitute the essence of belief and desire.
Sobel and Copp recognize the relevance of Hume here also, and begin their essay by calling attention to his connection with the direction of fit debate.
Sobel and Copp conclude this as well (2001, pp. 52–53).
References
Anscombe GEM (1957) Intention. Blackwell, Oxford
Humberstone IL (1992) Direction of fit. Mind 101:59–83
Smith M (1994) The moral problem. Blackwell, Oxford
Sobel D, Copp D (2001) Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire. Analysis 61:44–53
Zangwill N (1998) Direction of fit and normative functionalism. Philos Stud 91:173–203
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank David Sobel and anonymous referees for this journal for helpful comments on this paper.
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Milliken, J. In a Fitter Direction: Moving Beyond the Direction of Fit Picture of Belief and Desire. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 11, 563–571 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9117-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9117-7