Abstract
The Vienna Circle and the Berlin Group were schools of scientific philosophy that fought a common enemy—philosophical idealism and philosophical traditionalism in general. Their historically decisive influence makes it all the more disappointing that their intertwined story has not come down to us with due regard to its complexity. For the received account—that the Vienna Circle directed the scientific philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s—perpetuates an oversimplified picture of a seminal development of twentieth-century Western intellectual history. The fact is that the Berlin Group was an equal partner with the Vienna Circle, albeit one that pursued an itinerary of its own. But while the latter presented its defining projects in readily discernible terms and became immediately popular, the Berlin Group, whose project was at least as significant as that of its Austrian counterpart, remained largely unrecognized. The task of this chapter is to distinguish the Berliners’ work from that of the Vienna Circle and to bring to light its impact in the history of scientific philosophy.
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Notes
- 1.
Reichenbach’s letter to Heinrich Scholz from 13.10.1931 [HR 013-31-06].
- 2.
For criticism of this term see the last paragraphs of Sect. 1.8.
- 3.
Reichenbach’s letter to Ernst von Aster, June 3, 1935 [HR-013-39-34]. Indeed, the manuscripts submitted to Erkenntnis were to be sent to Berlin, not to Vienna. This is reflected in the fact that on the cover of the first four volumes of the journal, Reichenbach’s name was printed in bigger characters than the name of the official co-editor Carnap.
- 4.
- 5.
Cf. Danneberg and Schernus (1994). We shall speak about this double naming of the Society a little bit later.
- 6.
In order to understand what the predicate “friendly” meant in German philosophy around 1930, we must recall how hostile the relation between, what later were called, continental and analytic philosophers (for example, between Carnap and Heidegger) was.
- 7.
On this point, we agree with Peter Simons that “the way philosophical disputes get decided and the way subsequent history is written depend little on the dialectical strength, adequacy or sophistication of the position posed” (Simons 1997, 442).
- 8.
- 9.
Hempel’s impression, too, was that Grelling “didn’t want to enter a university career. I don’t quite understand why” (Hempel 2000, 6; my italics—N. M.).
- 10.
On Grellings’s work with Leonard Nelson, see Sect. 1.4, below.
- 11.
On the contacts between Grelling and Reichenbach before 1926, see Sect. 1.5.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
A letter of Felix Meiner to Reichenbach from 5.12.33 [HR 013-24-33].
- 15.
Cf. Danneberg and Schernus (1994, 396, n. 26).
- 16.
Cf. Reichenbach’s letter to Heinrich Scholtz from 05.01.1928 [015-41-15].
- 17.
Cf. Gerner (1997, 106).
- 18.
On Alexander Herzberg see Schernus (1994).
- 19.
See Sect. 1.4, below.
- 20.
Cf. Reichenbach’s letter to Philipp Frank of 1.05.29 [HR 014-06-31].
- 21.
Cf. Sect. 1.7, (ii), below.
- 22.
Cf. Leitko (1998, 154).
- 23.
Cf. Sect. 1.7, (ii), below.
- 24.
The Viennese Musil was 1931–33 in Berlin.
- 25.
This sentence in Neurath’s “Remarks” was written by Reichenbach. Cf. Reichenbach’s letter to Otto Neurath of 24.04.1930 [HR 013-41-70].
- 26.
How little this period of the German philosophical thought is known today is clear when we glance in the Routledge Philosophy of Science Encyclopedia in which we read: “What is called philosophy of science today has its roots in both the British and the Austrian tradition … (with Bolzano, Mach, and others)” (Sarkar and Pfeifer 2006, xi).
- 27.
On the influence of Ernst Cassirer on the Berlin Group see the last paragraph of Sect. 1.7, (ii), as well as Chap. 4. It deserves notice that Nelson and Cassirer were engaged in a heated dispute. In 1906 Nelson published a very negative review of Hermann Cohen’s book Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (1902). Cassirer’s answer to Nelson was reciprocally antagonistic.
- 28.
Cf. Peckhaus (1990, 152 f).
- 29.
See Sect. 1.7, (ii), below.
- 30.
Grete Hermann was also active in earlier sessions of the Society. In one of them she claimed that quantum physics can be easily made to agree with determinism; Werner Heisenberg found this idea very interesting (Danneberg and Schernus 1994, 396–7, n. 26).
- 31.
On the history of the Monist Group cf. Herzberg (1928).
- 32.
Cf. Reichenbach (1914). The character of this dispute is to be perhaps better understood with reference to the fact that, in general, Reichenbach had problems with persons that purposivelly strived to influence the public opinion. Typical examples are Otto Neurath and Carl Popper. Leonard Nelson was at least as resolute to exercise influence on society as these two. (I am indebted for this remark to Andreas Kamlah.)
- 33.
Additional information on the conflict between Hermann Lietz and Gustav Wyneken is to be found in Chap. 7.
- 34.
Flavia Padovani, for example, deplores: “The reason why Reichenbach finally veered off to Hensel is not clear” (Padovani 2008, 39).
- 35.
Cf. Carnap (1936, 14).
- 36.
Cf. Thiel (1993).
- 37.
In his Dissertation Reichenbach also discussed Ernst Friedrich Apelt’s Theory of Induction (1854), which appears on Reichenbach’s bibliography. Apelt was student and friend of Fries. In the draft of the dissertation, Reichenbach refers as well to Fries’ Essay in a Critique of the Principles of Calculus of Probability (1842).
- 38.
Cf. Eberhardt and Glymour (2008, 15 ff).
- 39.
Today, this claim is controversial: cf. Friedman and Nordmann (2006).
- 40.
- 41.
Cf. Chap. 8.
- 42.
See also Reichenbach (1947, 127 n).
- 43.
“Diskussion über Wahrscheinlichkeit”, Erkenntnis 1 (1930): 260–85 (Grelling’s contribution is on p. 278).
- 44.
- 45.
Cf. Grelling’s letter to Reichenbach of 28.01.1936 [HR 013-14-04].
- 46.
- 47.
- 48.
Cf. Sect. (ii), below.
- 49.
Cf. Reichenbach’s letter to Schlick from 2.01.1933 [HR 013–30–13].
- 50.
See the motto to this chapter.
- 51.
In fact, the only message of Wittgenstein assimilated in Berlin was the thesis that logic is tautological in character.
- 52.
Moreover, Reichenbach showed willingness for “peaceful debates” with “speculative”, or idealistic, philosophers, such like Oskar Becker. See Reichenbach (1931a).
- 53.
- 54.
One piece of evidence is Einstein’s review of Reichenbach’s Philosophy of Space and Time. Cf. Einstein (1928).
- 55.
Cf. Chap. 13. It deserves notice that around 1930, Carnap’s interest in Hilbert radically increased (arguably, under Dubislav’s and Reichenbach’s influence), a development that found expression in his Logical Syntax (1934).
- 56.
- 57.
Italics mine—N. M.
- 58.
Cf. Sect. 1.3, above.
- 59.
This point is confirmed by the fact that Reichenbach referred to Ernst Cassirer (his professor at the University of Berlin), when he spoke about the historical roots of the Berlin Group in Neurath (1930, 312) (cf. n. 25).
- 60.
- 61.
- 62.
Moritz Schlick’s letter to Wolfgang Wildenband, 15.03.1931.
- 63.
- 64.
This point has become especially prominent during recent decades (cf. Howard 2000, 75 f.).
- 65.
In contrast to his friend Burton Dreben and his acolytes at Harvard.
- 66.
Preliminary versions of this Chapter were read at the Universities of Bochum, Graz, Pittsburgh and Vancouver. I am grateful for stimulating discussions.
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Milkov, N. (2013). The Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle: Affinities and Divergences. In: Milkov, N., Peckhaus, V. (eds) The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 273. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5485-0_1
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