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A critique of Stephane Savanah’s “mirror self-recognition and symbol-mindedness”

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Abstract

Stephane Savanah (Savanah Biol Philos 28:657–673, 2013) provides a critique of theories of self-recognition that largely mirrors my own critique (though without recognizing it) that I began publishing two decades ago. In addition, he both misconstrues my kinesthetic-visual matching model of mirror self-recognition (MSR) in multiple ways (though he appears to agree with the actual model), and misconstrues the evidence in the scientific literature on MSR. I describe points of agreement in our thinking about self-recognition, and criticize and rectify inaccuracies.

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Acknowledgment

I appreciate the good humor with which Stef Savanah read my critique and responded to emails.

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Correspondence to Robert W. Mitchell.

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Mitchell, R.W. A critique of Stephane Savanah’s “mirror self-recognition and symbol-mindedness”. Biol Philos 30, 137–144 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9403-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9403-1

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