Abstract
In deliberate contrast to the ethical intellectualism of Socrates, Aristotle develops a complex conception of virtues as character traits which are closely tied to the different elements and stages of their cultivation: in the gradual process of becoming good, ‘learning by doing’ is the central cornerstone for establishing a close connectivity between emotion and reason as well as between desire, decision and right action. Virtue as a perfection of human nature engenders the best possible integration of irrational striving with reason in the soul and is thus the constitutive component of human flourishing.
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Notes
- 1.
I will not take into account the Magna Moralia, another ethical treatise which is attributed to Aristotle but was probably not written by himself.
- 2.
All quotations from Aristotle are taken from Barnes 1984, with the notable difference that aretē is translated as “virtue” and not as “excellence”.
- 3.
Accordingly, Aristotle shows the tendency to use aretē without further specification as a shorthand expression for ethical or character virtue. I will follow this usage.
- 4.
There are also other ‘losers’ in Aristotle’s ethics, i.e. character types who cannot make moral progress (Curzer 2012, Chap. 17).
- 5.
This is one of the reasons why Aristotle deliberately turns his back on the Socratic notion of a virtue-technē (Angier 2010, Chap. 2): He does not subscribe to the idea that knowledge of the good is sufficient for moral motivation.
- 6.
Another interesting approach to solve the problem of acquiring moral motivation is provided by Fossheim (2006), who points to mimēsis as habituation of the fine in musical performances. This idea ties in nicely with the basic Aristotelian structure of learning by doing (and not by simply being affected).
- 7.
For this translation see Lorenz 2009, pp. 196–197.
- 8.
This seems to tie the mean closely to a single scale, but it is also possible to define courage and the two extremes surrounding it in terms of the emotion of confidence and not only with regard to fear, as Aristotle himself recognises (NE 1107a33). Yet then there are more than two opposites involved.
- 9.
This reading is to a certain extent indebted to the conception of metriopatheia, which in Aristotle’s school, the Peripatos, was later pitted against the Stoic ideal of apatheia, i.e. the extirpation of passions in the wise person.
- 10.
If this were the case Aristotle would probably have used pros tina instead of pros hēmas (Brown 1997, p. 89).
- 11.
For further passages in NE and EE see Moss (2011) with a thorough discussion.
- 12.
It is an open discussion of whether this more substantial understanding of the role of phronēsis commits Aristotle to a ‘grand-end view’ according to which practical wisdom operates with a comprehensive blueprint of the overall human good in determining human conduct (Kraut 1993) or if phronēsis only deliberates about more limited local ends (Broadie 1991, pp. 198–202).
- 13.
This conjunction does not pertain to the other intellectual virtues: one can be wise in theoretical matters (sophos) without possessing practical wisdom (NE 1141b3–8).
- 14.
It is better to avoid the often used expression ‘unity thesis’ for the relationship between the virtues in Aristotle: this formula fits only for the Socratic point of view, according to which all virtues are ultimately identical. Aristotle, instead, argues for a ‘reciprocity thesis’.
- 15.
The reciprocity thesis might also be conceived of as a kind of regulative ideal (Russell 2014, pp. 215–216).
- 16.
As does Korsgaard (1996, esp. p. 205); contra: Whiting (2002). There are some ‘Kantian’ readings of Aristotle’s notion of virtue, apart from Korsgaard also by Sherman (1997) and Hursthouse (1999, Chaper 4). However, Aristotle does not share Kant’s overriding concern for morality (in the modern sense) and would probably regard Kantian virtues as mere forms of strength of will.
- 17.
For kalon as the object of virtuous choice see, e.g., NE 1115b12–13. See also Cooper (1999, pp. 264–279) for the three kinds of desires which correspond to the fine, the advantageous and the pleasurable.
- 18.
The attempt by Gardiner (2004) to distinguish between basic and non-basic virtues in Aristotle lacks sufficient textual backing.
- 19.
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Müller, J. (2021). Becoming a Good Human Being: Aristotle on Virtue and Its Cultivation. In: Halbig, C., Timmermann, F. (eds) Handbuch Tugend und Tugendethik. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24466-8_10
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