Abstract
I consider cases in which a person’s action causes a foreseeable harm, but does so through an unforeseeable causal path. According to a common view, the person is blameless for the harm in such cases. I argue that any defense of this common view incurs serious costs. I then show how a popular view about resultant luck can make the rejection of the common view palatable.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I am grateful to two anonymous referees for this journal for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
References
Bernstein, S. (2019). Moral Luck and Deviant Causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 43, 151–161
Davidson, D. (1980). Freedom to Act. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 63–82). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Feinberg, J. (1970). Sua Culpa. In Doing and Deserving (pp. 187–221). Princeton: Princeton University Press
Fischer, J. M. (1986). Responsibility and Failure. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 86, 251–270
Fischer, J. M., & N. A. Tognazzini (2009). The Truth about Tracing, Noûs, 43, 531–556
Ginet, C. (2000). The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom, 267–277
Montminy, M. (2019). Derivative Culpability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 689–709
Pizarro, D., Uhlmann, E., & P. Bloom (2003). Causal Deviance and the Attribution of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 653–660
Sartorio, C. (2007). Causation and Responsibility. Philosophy Compass, 2, 749–765
Sartorio, C. (2016). Causation and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Sher, G. (2009). Who Knew? Responsibility without Awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Smith, H. (1983). Culpable Ignorance. Philosophical Review, 92, 543–571
Sverdlik, S. (1988). Crime and Moral Luck. American Philosophical Quarterly, 25, 79–86
Swenson, P. (2019). Luckily, We Are Only Responsible for What We Could Have Avoided. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 43, 106–118
Vargas, M. (2005). The Trouble with Tracing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29, 269–291
Wolf, S. (2001). The Moral of Moral Luck. Philosophic Exchange, 31, 2–16
Zimmerman, M. (2002). Taking Luck Seriously. Journal of Philosophy, 99, 553–576
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Montminy, M. It was not supposed to happen like that: blameworthiness, causal deviance and luck. Philos Stud 180, 439–449 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01883-6
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01883-6