Abstract
Although Socrates’ use of induction and epagogic argumentation in Plato’s dialogues is well studied, scholarship on Platonic methodology lacks a clear account of Plato’s own view of epagōgē. In this paper, I refute Richard Robinson’s claim that Plato had no awareness of epagōgē, arguing that the “method of collection” serves as Plato’s theory of dialectical induction. Using the evidence of both the Statesman and the Sophist, I maintain that the abstraction characteristic of collection may be ‘purified’ of its empirical origins in its dialectical application to the inquiry into forms. In addition to providing a unifying thread from Socratic to Platonic and, finally, Aristotelian epagōgē, this view also offers evidence for the consistency of dialectical methodology within the dialogues.
An abridged, earlier draft of this paper was published in Spring 2019 as: Platonic epagōgē and the “purification” of the method of collection. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2), 353–364.
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Notes
- 1.
Despite the fact that, as Julia Annas [2], Gregory Vlastos [23] and others have noted, Aristotle’s use of epaktikos does not correspond to modern logic’s definition of induction, this terminology remains the most recognizable translation of epagōgē. Though I agree with these authors, my argument does not hinge on a technical definition of the form, but instead upon establishing that Plato had an interest in setting up collection as a fruitful ground for dialectical reasoning.
- 2.
There is a great deal of interpretive ambiguity in these accounts, since Aristotle insists in Prior Analytics II.24 that paradeigma differs from epagōgē in that the latter begins from “all the particular cases,” rather than from some exemplary ones [3‚ 69a17]. The form of epagogic argument, which Robinson designates “enumeratively certain epagoge” [20, p. 36] is elaborated in more detail in Prior Analytics II.23.
- 3.
In addition, Robinson argues that each method treats quite different objects: in the case of the ‘upward path’, Robinson characterizes it as concerning ideas, such as ‘the good’, whereas he claims collection and division treat genus and species [20‚ p. 163]. There has been great debate in the scholarly literature over the nature of what is treated by collection and division. I add my voice to those who reject the notion that they treat genus and species, advocating for a view similar to Cristina Ionescu, who argues persuasively that these methods may treat a variety of objects: “Depending on the level at which we collect and divide, we have as our objects intelligible forms as they are in themselves or as inherent in something else” [10, p. 48].
- 4.
Collection is described or demonstrated at: Phaedrus 249b–c, 265d, 266b5–6; Sophist 219b11–c7, 234 b3, 253d7; Philebus 23e5, 25a3. Division is described at: Phaedrus 265e1–3, 273e2; Sophist 218d5, 220a8–9, 221b3, 253d1, 262b, 264d10–e2, 282a1–4; Statesman 282a1–4, 287c.
- 5.
This process of abstraction does indeed appear to coincide with the depiction of recollection as the ‘recognition of similarities’ in the Phaedo, but also with the common hypothesis of the forms, referenced at Republic 507b.
- 6.
Although Ambuel asserts that “there is no collection in the Sophist and there can be none” [1‚ p. 38] and, more generally, Deborah De Chiara-Quenzer claims that demonstration of collection is missing from the later dialogues because it is an easier method to acquire [7, p. 98], many scholars have argued that collection does not simply provide the starting point for dialectic but remains an integral part of dialectical reasoning, appearing in new guises, viz., Cornford regarding the Statesman [6‚ p. 171]. Kenneth Sayre claims that collection becomes paradigmatism [22] and, similar to Cornford’s view of the Sophist, Mitchell Miller [14] claims that the first six failed divisions of the Statesman constitute an extended collection. Kenneth Dorter makes the intriguing suggestion that the method of division is the focus of the later dialogues only because its philosophical use requires that it not remain value-neutral, as it is in sophistry, and that division must not be allowed to remain dianoetic but convert the thinking of the one who engages in it to noēsis [8, pp. 113–117]. What I argue here might be best understood as extending this same claim to collection.
- 7.
Cristina Ionescu makes a similar claim in her work on the Sophist [10].
- 8.
See also Hugh Benson’s Clitophon’s challenge: Dialectic in Plato’s “Meno”, “Phaedo”, and “Republic” [5] on the relationship between hypothesis and dialectic.
- 9.
Note that while the Stranger suggests living creatures (zōōn) and soulless thing (apsychōn) as the basis for the following division of purifications, a division he’s invoked earlier in the division of hunting, Theaetetus innovates, crafting a far more bifurcatory and comprehensive division of soul from body. Clearly Theaetetus does not need to be taught the lesson that Young Socrates receives in the Statesman regarding ‘cutting too quickly’ to a target class (Statesman 262b).
- 10.
This process has its analogue in the Stranger’s explanation of the “example of example” at Statesman 278 b–c.
- 11.
This image is employed by the Stranger in the Sophist, as he reviews their definition: “Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam (diploēn) in him” [ibid., 267e7–9].
- 12.
This maintains consistency with the Stranger’s claim, noted earlier, that division’s ‘purificatory’ work is not based on absolute values, but instead upon pragmatic ones depending on the circumstances of the inquiry.
- 13.
Sayre [21, p. 61] makes a compelling case against the Aristotelianizing view that division is a matter of distinguishing genus and species.
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Moore, H. (2021). Does Plato Have a Theory of Induction? Epagōgē and the Method of Collection “Purified” of the Senses. In: Bjelde, J.A., Merry, D., Roser, C. (eds) Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity. Argumentation Library, vol 39. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70817-7_9
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