Abstract
This paper argues that many leading ethical theories are incomplete, in that they fail to account for both right and wrong. It also argues that some leading ethical theories are inconsistent, in that they allow that an act can be both right and wrong. The paper also considers responses on behalf of the target theories.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adams R (1996) The concept of a divine command. In: Phillips DZ (ed) Religion and morality. Macmillan, London, pp 59–80
Brandt (1992) Morality, utilitarianism, and rights. Cambridge University Press, New York
Firth R (1952) Ethical absolutism and the ideal observer. Philos Phenomenol Res 12:317–345
Gauthier D (1986) Morals by agreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Herman B (1993) The practice of moral judgment. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Hill T Jr (1992) Dignity and practical reason. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY
Hobbes T (1651) Leviathan. Basil Blackwell, Oxford
Hooker B (2000) Ideal code, real world: a rule-consequentialist theory of morality. Clarendon, Oxford
Hursthouse R (1999) On virtue ethics. Clarendon, Oxford
Hursthouse R (2006) Are virtues the proper starting point for morality? In: Dreier J (ed) Contemporary debates in moral theory. Blackwell, Malden, MA
Korsgaard C (1996) Creating the kingdom of ends. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
O’Neill O (1989) Constructions of reason: explorations of Kant’s practical philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Plato (1997) Euthyphro. In: Cooper J (ed) Plato: complete works. Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge
Quinn P (2000) Divine command ethics. In: Lafollette H (ed) Ethical theory. Blackwell, Oxford
Railton P (1984) Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality. Philos Public Aff 13: 134–171
Scanlon T (1998) What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Shafer-Landau R (2004) Whatever happened to good and evil? Oxford University Press, Oxford
Slote M (1995) Agent-based virtue ethics. Midwest Stud Philos 20:83–101
Slote M (2001) Morals from motives. Oxford University Press, New York
Swanton C (2003) Virtue ethics: a pluralistic view. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Timmons M (2002) Moral theory: an introduction. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD
Williams B (1985) Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Fontana, London
Zagzebski L (1996) Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge University Press, New York
Zagzebski L (2004) Divine motivation theory. Cambridge University Press, New York
Acknowledgement
I thank those who commented on ancestors of this paper at the following meetings: ‘Virtue theory: old & new’ conference, Christchurch, June 2002; American Philosophical Association (Western Division), San Francisco, March 2003; Philosophy Department seminar, University of Hawaii, March 2003; Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, South Molle Island, July 2004; Joint Session conference, Kent, July 2004; Philosophy Department seminars, University of Otago, August 2004, May 2006; and British Society for Ethical Theory, Southampton, July 2006. My particular thanks to: Stephen Gardiner, Sean McAleer, Roy Perrett, Kent Hurtig, Jonas Olson, Elinor Mason, Garrett Cullity, Tim Mulgan, Martin Wilkinson and Brad Hooker.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Moore, A. Ethical Theory, Completeness & Consistency. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 297–308 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-007-9070-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-007-9070-x