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Open Access Published by De Gruyter September 22, 2010

Dewey on The Emotions

  • Donald Morse
From the journal Human Affairs

Dewey on The Emotions

This paper explores John Dewey's theory of the emotions and his reasons for developing it. The author considers two competing accounts for why Dewey might have developed his theory: one based on his attempt to clarify rationality and one based on his attempt to make us morally responsive agents to nature. After a close examination of key texts, the author concludes that Dewey's theory is designed to make us morally responsive. Dewey's theory of the emotions serves his purpose of arguing for our re-union with nature, in a manner similar, in fact, to Hegel, with the addition that Dewey makes it our express goal to be concerned for nature in our return to it.



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Published Online: 2010-09-22
Published in Print: 2010-09-01

© 2010 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

This content is open access.

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