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Acknowledgments
The papers in this special issue were originally presented at a conference on Ontological Commitment, organized by the Centre for Time at the University of Sydney, 30 November–1 December, 2007. We are grateful to the Australian Research Council and the University of Sydney, whose financial support made the conference possible.
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Moretti, L., Price, H. Introduction. Philos Stud 141, 1–5 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9259-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9259-4