Abstract
Panpsychism has often been motivated on the grounds that any attempt to account for experience and consciousness in organisms in purely physical, nonexperiential terms faces severe difficulties. The “combination problem” charges that attributing phenomenal properties to the basic constituents of organisms (“microphenomenal” properties), as panpsychism proposes, likewise fails to provide a satisfactory basis for experience in humans and other organisms. This paper evaluates a recent attempt to understand, and solve, the combination problem. This approach, due to Sam Coleman, is premised on a distinction between mere aggregates and genuine unities, and the purported inability of subjects to constitute a unity. In response, I first argue that it may not be incumbent upon the panpsychist to explain how microphenomenal properties could constitute a unity in the way that Coleman supposes. I then argue that even if such a burden does fall on the panpsychist, it is far from clear that a plurality subjects cannot constitute such a unity. Finally, I argue that if one adopts a functionalist account of macrosubjects, as Coleman does, there is little reason to think that a plurality of subjects could not constitute a macrosubject. In these ways, I argue that the force of the combination problem does not turn on whether microphenomenal properties require minds or subjects that have them.
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Notes
This way of putting things supposes that there are distinctive properties corresponding to the predicates of physics—for example, that corresponding to the dispositional descriptions of physics, there are distinctive dispositional properties. It may be claimed, in contrast, that physics, and perhaps natural science generally, provides (for example) dispositional descriptions of properties that are not themselves purely dispositional, and that metaphysically the dispositional coincides with the “qualitative” (as argued in Heil 2003). In either case, however, the first motivation for panpsychism will involve the idea that an understanding of the world in terms of physics cannot account for the nature and existence of experience, and thus that “physicSalism” is false. In contrast, standard physicalisms (reductive and nonreductive) appear to involve some form of “physicSalism”.
One who takes this option may add that the dependence of experience on purely physical, nonexperiential features or properties is not as robust as might have been thought—for example, that experience only arises from purely physical, nonexperiential features of the world given contingent “psychophysical laws” (as discussed in Chalmers 1996).
Mention of the purely physical, nonexperiential features of these constituents—that is, those features described and captured by physics—will be redundant if one holds that the microphenomenal features are strictly identical with features described by physics (see fn. 2). Mention of the purely physical, nonexperiential features of the constituent of organisms may also prove unnecessary if one holds, as those attracted to panpsychism and related doctrines have sometimes maintained, that the properties described by physics are grounded in, though perhaps not identical with, microphenomenal or microqualitative features.
This reasoning could be worked on in various ways. For example, it could be argued that insofar as one eschews a kind of emergentism, the remaining option is really the disjunction of panpsychism and the “panprotopsychist” view that the constituents of organisms have “protoexperiential properties”, properties that while not phenomenal ground experience in organisms (see Chalmers 2015); the latter view, at least on some articulations, may be best regarded as a kind of neutral monism and perhaps even a form of physicalism (as argued in Montero 2010; for discussion, see Morris forthcoming). My focus in what follows will be on the more explicitly panpsychist view that the basic constituents of organisms have some experiential or phenomenal character, but see fn. 11 for related discussion.
In this respect, I agree with Nagel (1979, 1986) and Strawson (2006a), though I am less confident than they are that experience cannot be accounted for in purely physical terms; and while my focus here will typically be on panpsychism, I am less dismissive than Strawson when it comes to neutral monist or “panprotopsychist” responses to the initial line of reasoning from the rejection of both psychophysical reduction (“physicSalism”) and emergentist dualism to panpsychism (see fn. 5).
My terminology here (and elsewhere) follows Chalmers 2015 and forthcoming.
See Chalmers (forthcoming) and Goff (2009, forthcoming).
Chalmers (2015, forthcoming). The “combination problem” appears to have been originally so named in Seager (1995). For recent discussion, see Chalmers (2015) and forthcoming, Coleman (2012, 2014, forthcoming), Goff (2006, 2009, forthcoming), Seager (1995, 2010), and Strawson (Strawson 2006a, b, forthcoming).
This glosses over some details regarding Coleman’s account of macrosubjects as well as his distinction between the unity of macrophenomenal wholes and unity of macrosubjects; see Sect. 5 for discussion. In holding that microphenomenal elements do not require subjects, Coleman takes himself to be moving towards neutral monism; indeed, he puts his position on the combination problem as suggesting that panpsychists should be neutral monists (2014, 20–21; forthcoming). I do not wish to dwell on this issue, which in part is one of labeling. Nonetheless, it is not clear to me that the mere removal of microsubjects warrants the “neutral monism” label. In particular, while denying microsubjects, Coleman appears to attribute to the basic constituents of reality qualities of the same kind as those that characterize the experiences of organisms; in this sense, such properties are not “neutral”, but rather might be better described as “mental” or “psychic”. Chalmers forthcoming is similarly ambivalent about labeling here, writing that while Coleman’s view can “be seen as a sort of neutral monism” it is yet “closely related to panpsychism”.
See, for example, Goff (2009, forthcoming). Coleman (2012, 148; 2014, 25) attributes this assumption to Strawson. However, this is complicated by the fact that Strawson endorses a thin conception of subjects of experience (2006b, 192) and more generally holds that the subject-property distinction itself is not metaphysically deep (2006b, 193–199; see also forthcoming).
I will not evaluate Coleman’s arguments for denying that microphenomenal or microqualitative elements require minds that have them. He develops (2012, 148–152) an argument from Foster (2000). The key idea is that awareness of qualities presupposes the logical independence of the qualities from the awareness of them. Coleman (2014, 40–41) also appeals to the lack of compelling arguments against the possibility of qualities existing outside of the awareness of a mind, as well as some common sense considerations. While I am not sure about the force of Coleman’s considerations, I have sympathy with the idea that qualities in general do not require minds, since I am inclined to agree with considerations in favor of the need for qualities in any adequate metaphysical picture (see Heil 2003; Unger 1998).
The ambiguity introduced by the “in some sense” locution regarding the separateness of the constituents of an aggregate, as well as the powers of an aggregate, is intentional. Focusing on the latter issue, it should first be noted that in Coleman’s examples of aggregates, there are properties of the whole that cannot be attributed to any particular constituent. For example, a pile of bricks may serve as protective barrier from the wind, whereas no individual brick has this power. While such powers and properties are intelligibly related to those of the constituents of the aggregates, Coleman maintains that the same is true of a genuine unity and that even in a genuine unity there is likewise no radical emergence of utterly novel or powers or properties. That he understands the unities in this way is no accident, since he is emphatic that such emergence would be antithetical to panpsychism; hence, if it were claimed that unities involve radically emergent powers, the analogy with experience in organisms could not be maintained (see fn. 20 for related discussion). Given this, however, it is not clear that the difference between the powers of a mere aggregate and those of a genuine unity (in Coleman’s sense) is a difference in kind rather than in degree. Given this, it should not be surprising if the difference between the powers of what I will call an “ordinary whole” and those of a mere aggregate likewise proves to be one of degree rather than kind. Related remarks apply to the notion of “relating to the world as an integrated whole” and to the notion of constituents “intrinsically affecting” each other as well.
See fn. 17.
Perhaps in coming to constitute mousetrap, some of the constituents are “deformed” in ways that cannot be easily reversed. Perhaps the spring will never be as springy, for example. But I doubt that it follows from this that the constituents fail to remain “essentially separate” from each other. One reason is that is not in virtue of such “deforming” or “modification” that the constituents of a mousetrap are bound together. Another reason is that such a claim will threaten the idea that a heap of sand is a mere aggregate, as it may be that each grain of sand will never quite be the same (microphysically, for example) after being a constituent of a heap. Likewise, while the constituents of a mousetrap causally interact, it does not seem that mere causal interaction can be enough for them to count as “intrinsically affecting” one another, for in this case a heap of sand will not count as a mere aggregate. These remarks might be taken to support the suggestion that the difference between the wholes of interest is ultimately one of degree rather than kind (see fn. 17 for related discussion).
Some may claim that none of these conditions suffice for having a genuine, true unity; this will be the case if one thinks, like monists in the Bradleyian tradition, that in a genuinely unified whole, the constituents are in some manner absorbed into that whole (see Bradley 1893/1969). A position along these lines about experience in organisms is defended in Seager (2010). Coleman (2014, 34–36) appears to hold that such a robustly holistic position would conflict with the panpsychist rejection of emergence, and he emphasizes that in his examples of unities the constituents continue to exist despite being modified by the other constituents. I am not sure, however, that such a robustly holistic position about the experiences of organisms would involve emergence in the same way that the panpsychist denies that experience can emerge, in a brute and inexplicable way, from purely physical, nonexperiential constituents. For example, while such views could be cast as involving the diachronic emergence of experience in organisms, it is hard to see how they could be interpreted as involving synchronic emergence, since such views essentially claim that insofar as an experience of an organism has constituents at all, it is the experience of the organism that is prior to and more basic than the constituents. What does seem to be the case, however, is that such robustly holistic views do not comport well with the “constitutivist” approach to experience in organisms that panpsychists have seemed to endorse, that such experiences metaphysically depend on the more basic constituents of organisms.
See fn. 17 and fn. 19.
See, for example, Chalmers and Bayne (2003).
Goff’s (forthcoming) “phenomenal bonding” solution to the combination problem might be interpreted as taking microminds to form something like what I have called “ordinary wholes”. Goff proposes that while subjects as such may not “sum” to a further subject, they can ground a further subject if related by “phenomenal bonding” relations. While Goff does not rule out the idea that the obtaining of such “bonding relations” results in the “intrinsic modification” of the relata, his remarks on the status of “bonding relations” are consistent with these relations being “external” to what they relate. For example, he takes seriously the proposal that the spatial relation is the phenomenal bonding relation. But it is plausible, independently of panpsychist metaphysics, that spatial relations are “external” to their relata if any relations are.
See fn. 20.
It could be claimed that the separateness of subjects precludes a plurality of subjects from constituting a whole in which the constituents are absorbed into and effaced by the whole (see fn. 20). While this issue deserves further discussion, the following admittedly brief remarks are pertinent. First, while many will grant that experiences of organisms are unified wholes in Coleman’s sense, the claim that they are unities in this more radically holistic (or monistic) sense is less obvious. Second, Coleman’s assumption is that such holism does not comport well with contemporary panpsychism (see fn. 20).
See fn. 11.
See Chalmers forthcoming.
In more recent work, he appears to be more deeply wedded to the higher-order approach; see Coleman forthcoming.
Note that the claim here is not that the addition of microsubjects could not make a difference to the causal or functional profile of the constituents of organisms. Rather, the claim specifically concerns why it should be thought that the addition of microsubjects positively precludes the constituents of organisms from playing the right roles so as to ground a macrosubject. The idea is that if functionalism about macrosubjects is accepted, then whether the constituents of organisms can ground a macrosubject is a matter of what they can do; and given this, the addition of microsubjects would only present a problem for the grounding of a macrosubject if there were reason to think that microsubjects would preclude the constituents of organisms from playing the right roles. It is consistent with maintaining that there is no such reason that the addition of microsubjects could make some difference to the causal or functional profile of the constituents of organisms. Related remarks apply to Fig. 1: while in Fig. 1 I have assumed that adding microsubjects results in the same functional profile, the point could be made without this assumption: it is consistent with my point that one may add arrows to (b), so long as adding arrows to (b) does not result in any modification to the arrows currently represented in (b).
As Strawson (2006a, forthcoming) insists.
See fn. 29.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank members of my Spring 2015 metaphysics seminar at Tulane University for helpful discussion of these issues. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees at this journal for helpful critical comments and suggestions. Work on this paper was supported, in part, by a Faculty Retreat Grant from A Studio in the Woods and the Tulane-Xavier Center for Bioenvironmental Research, although the views here do not necessarily represent the views of these organizations.
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Morris, K. The Combination Problem: Subjects and Unity. Erkenn 82, 103–120 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9808-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9808-8