Abstract
As Ilham Dilman puts it: ‘language is the source of the system we find in nature’. There is no conception of reality independent of language. There are at least three problems with this - Kuhn’s and Wittgenstein’s - way of thinking: (1) the problem of incommensurability; (2) the problem of idealism - in the case of Kuhn and Wittgenstein, a linguistic idealism; (3) the problem of conceptual relativism. In this paper, I argue that ‘incommensurability’ is a non-problem. I then defend Kuhn and Wittgenstein against the charge of linguistic idealism by showing that and how, on their view, our concepts attach to the world. Finally, I deflate the charge of conceptual relativism by arguing that although they reject the existence of an objective basis lying outside all human conceptual frameworks and world-pictures, neither Wittgenstein nor Kuhn endorses an indiscriminate acceptance of all conceptual schemes. In conclusion, however, we shall see that only Wittgenstein finds the stopping-place of relativism - in his naturalism.
