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A Tenseless Account of the Presence of Experience

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Abstract

Tenseless theories of time entail that the only temporal properties exemplified by events are earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. Such an account seems to conflict with our common experience of time, which suggests that the present moment is ontologically unique and that time flows. Some have argued that only a tensed account of time, one in which past, present and future are objective properties, can do justice to our experience. Any theory that claims that the world is different from how we experience it must nonetheless be consistent with the having of that experience. Accordingly, in this essay I defend the tenseless theory by arguing that it can indeed account for certain key features of our experience of time without recourse to tensed properties.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L3N6

    J. M. Mozersky

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  1. J. M. Mozersky
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Correspondence to J. M. Mozersky.

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Mozersky, J.M. A Tenseless Account of the Presence of Experience. Philos Stud 129, 441–476 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-2106-3

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