Abstract
In this paper I propose an explanation for the impulsivity displayed by some of our emotional experiences. I begin by looking for such an account in the psychological and philosophical literatures. After expressing doubts regarding some approaches’ resources to account for the phenomenon at issue, I outline an account of emotional impulsivity by focusing on (1) its independence from judgment and deliberation; (2) its felt strength; and (3) its relationship to action. Following the intuition that there is a strong connection between the possession of skills and the ability to entertain certain representational states, I propose that the impulsivity of some emotional experiences can be explained by their characteristic inseparability from sets of sensorimotor skills.
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Notes
Ajax had a first episode of impulsivity, provoked by his anger/disappointment at not receiving Achille’s armor, which gave him murderous impulses. Thanks to the Editor for pointing this out.
The distinction between disposition and state emotional impulsivity could be further refined by saying that one of them is attributable to subjects while the other can only be ascribed to occurrent mental states (emotional episodes).
There is one notable exception, embedded in a theory of emotions. According to Frijda (1986, 2007), emotions are changes in states of action readiness caused by largely automatic appraisals. Meanwhile, impulsive emotional action is defined as one that proceeds without the formation of a prior intention or deliberation (2010). Frijda maintains that those actions are determined conjointly by the nature of the state of action readiness (what he calls its “aim”), what is perceived, and the individual’s action repertoire, and exhibit a sense or urge (what he also calls “control precedence”) and flexibility. There are several suggestive claims in Frijda’s discussion of impulsivity—that individuals have action repertoires; that what is perceived are affordances; and that in impulsive emotional actions subjects only use part of the available cue—yet, those are ideas he mostly mentions, rather than develops. Still, we are following Frijda in regarding independence from deliberation, urgency, and flexible action-orientedness as key features of episodes of emotional impulsivity.
I will not dwell longer on Frijda’s view on emotion, as it has heavily influenced Andrea Scarantino’s “motivational theory” (see below). So, much of what we have to say about Scarantino’s view applies mutatis mutandis to Frijda’s. We only add that we endorse Scarantino’s criticism of Frijda’s view that it does not develop an account of the intentionality of emotions, only of its motivational character.
Tappolet (2016) goes beyond this point to argue against approaches that emphasize the action orientation of emotions, arguing that these imply a form of modularity that does not correspond to emotions. My contention is that, if the action-orientation of emotions is explained at the proper level (which is not the level of physiology), these concerns can be overcome.
Below, I say more about the possibility of controlling emotional impulses.
Later on, we will discuss an attempt by Prinz to provide the emotions with something that could orient them to action.
In this vein, it is worth noting that Frijda, Ridderinkhof, and Rietveld similarly speak of “subthreshold preparatory potentiations” (2014, p. 2).
That impulsive emotions are more like “commands” than “preparers” does not mean anything different than what has already been said: precedence and/or preparation (the two components into which Scarantino 2014, organizes control precedence) are not sufficient for an emotion to be a cause. An impulsive emotional episode, on the other hand, seems to be what made me do what I did (like a command that actuates a device).
On a separate note, could it be that emotions and their action-orientation are a matter of “attitude” rather than content? This seems to be the thought behind Deonna and Teroni’s (2012) “attitudinal theory of emotions.” Yet, for serious doubts as to the soundness of the attitudinal theory, see Rossi and Tappolet (2019) and Ballard (2021).
State emotional impulsivity would probably count as a form of practical irrationality, by no means as strong as that of akrasia, in which the action prompted by the emotion (insulting and honking another driver that cut you off) and the action judged to be appropriate (avoid the risks of road rage, maintain driving etiquette) have incompatible conditions for success (what you do or are urged to do has success conditions incompatible with those of what you should do).
“Could” because the organism is capable of exercising these skills. “Should” because the experience has some motivational meaning for the organism. Its emotional response depends on what it is capable of doing. Thanks to a reviewer for helping me notice this nuance.
While skill-borne contents and affordances (as outlined by Gibson, 1979) can be interpreted as possibilities for action, they do possess significant differences. Primarily, it is essential to recognize that, according to Gibson (1979), the notion of an affordance serves as a theoretical framework created in lieu of representational content. Despite the fact that they convey information about both the environment and the animal, he consistently refused to consider affordances as a type of content. Instead, he maintained that the comprehension of affordances could be achieved solely through the principles of “ecological optics,” devoid of any reliance on intentional explanation. Skill-borne contents, on the other hand, have been distinctly presented as a type of mental, representational content.
For a different way of claiming that emotions can be both representations and responses, see Mitchel (2021). In his view, which has common ground with Deonna and Teroni’s attitudinal theory, emotions both represent values and respond to them.
Let us rephrase the above in a more positive way. If some emotional content is motor (non-conceptual possibilities for action) rather than propositional, imperatives like “flee!” are thereby propositional specifications of something that is not itself propositional. The conflict would consist in being simultaneously motivated in incompatible directions (feeling pulled to punch one’s boss in the face and judging it better not to do so). The satisfaction conditions of the felt pull and those of our judgment are incompatible.
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This work was funded by the Colombian Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (Minciencias) Postdoctoral Fellowship Program, grant number 80740–613-2020.
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Murillo-Lara, L.A. Emotional Impulsivity and Sensorimotor Skills. Rev.Phil.Psych. (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00715-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00715-8