Abstract
My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some to abandon the control-based account of responsibility and replace it with an alternative account. It leads others to deny the intuition that agents are responsible in these troublesome cases. After outlining the account of moral responsibility I have in mind, I look at some of the arguments made against the viability of this theory. I show that there are conceptual resources for salvaging the control account, focusing in particular on the nature of vigilance. I also argue that there is empirical data that supports the control account so conceived.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In this paper, I am concerned solely with moral responsibility. Any talk of ‘responsibility’ is shorthand for ‘moral responsibility’. Additionally, I am concerned solely with the accountability sense of responsibility, rather than the attributability or answerability senses (cf. Shoemaker 2015), where the accountability sense of responsibility picks out a range of attitudinal responses bound up in non-trivial ways to the Strawsonian reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt (Strawson 1962). Finally, I examine only retrospective responsibility, or responsibility for what one has done.
This is somewhat overstated. I mean that for anyone who holds that people are sometimes morally responsible for what they do, that person will agree that Paul is morally responsible for what he does.
Doris (2015: 43).
Clarke (2014: 164). Clarke does not cite this example in support of a scope argument.
Though his motivations were different, van Inwagen (1989) raised similar worries about the scarcity of control that agents possess. The suggestion I countenance above is the one he suggests. Even if the scope of controlled action is relatively small, we can use tracing mechanisms to maintain the relatively wide scope of moral responsibility.
Cf. Sher (2009: 83).
Sher (2009: 26–27, 74).
Here, the reasons are normatively connected to behavior. That is, in any context there will be normative reasons that speak in favor of certain forms of behavior and speak against others. Thus, when an agent unwittingly omits, the agent behaves in some way, but the reasons that speak against behaving in that way do not figure into the set of considerations to which the agent is actually sensitive. This account is designed to remain neutral between different theories of reasons. Internalists and externalists alike ought to be able to fill in the above proposal without any significant changes to the argument that I offer.
One consequence of this characterization is that it entails that no morally neutral behavior could be characterized as an unwitting omission. For example, on this account, if someone steps into the shower with socks on this would not count as an unwitting omission (assuming there is nothing morally significant about getting into the shower with your socks on). Someone might take issue with this consequence and thus take issue with the characterization itself. Randy Clarke (2014: 94) suggests that one might unwittingly omit in the context of a game. This dispute feels somewhat verbal, though we could (I think) characterize unwitting omissions as a species of unintentional omission, where unwitting omissions are those unintentional omissions that are morally significant.
Even if responsibility theorists maintain a distinction between self-control and epistemic agential capacities, there is still a tendency to include some distinctive epistemic component in the self-control capacities, as in Vargas (2013: 201–202) and Ekstrom (2000: 67). For this reason, lack of awareness of some salient aspect of one’s moral environment might suffice to count an agent as lacking relevant self-control capacities.
Pereboom (forthcoming: 185–186) also explains responsibility for unintentional omissions in terms of failures of vigilance. His conception of vigilance, however, is much narrower than the one in this paper. Pereboom describes vigilance as: “a persisting attunement to protect, which features, among other things, a standing disposition to respond to danger, triggered by indications of danger in the environment” (185). Vigilance, as I describe it, includes this disposition but also includes a range of other dispositions that have no connection to awareness of needs to protect (of course, there could be some naturalistic explanation of the development of vigilance that posits Pereboom’s disposition as a course-grained precursor to the more variegated and complex vigilance capacity that I countenance). Given Pereboom’s narrow conception of vigilance, he expresses skepticism that vigilance can furnish a general explanation of responsibility for unintentional omissions (186). Because I offer a thicker conception of vigilance, I take it that my vigilance account can furnish such a general explanation.
Following Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998: 69) discussion, this sensitivity comes in two dimensions: receptivity and reactivity. Vigilance is connected to both, though the latter dimension is unimportant for the purposes of this paper.
Cf. Vargas (2013: 214).
Note that this formulation remains neutral on whether situational factors themselves structure agential capacities or whether situational factors merely affect the operability of a particular capacity.
See Smith (2005).
In this, I follow a suggestion made in Doris and Stich (2007). Normative theories often contain empirical elements or make strong implications about the way the world is. As such, normative theorizing ought to be constrained by empirical considerations to some degree.
This proposal does not suggest reducing moral agency to neurobiology. I consider and respond to this concern in the next section.
Empirical confirmation in Aron et al. (2007), Aron and Poldrack (2006), Cavanagh et al. (2011), Jahafri (2011), Wiecki and Frank (2013), King et al. (2010), Kerns (2006). ‘Decisions’, here, is shorthand for computations performed by the dACC that issue in signals to implement relevant task representations.
This response is not likely to convince anyone skeptical of the idea of an unexercised capacity. Despite this, the response does show that the account has something principled to say for itself.
Craver (2007: 60).
Clarke (2014: 167).
In more recent work, Clarke (2016: 13) suggests that (2) and (3) might just be ways of analyzing out the relevant capacities mentioned in (1). The argument here does not depend on whether (1) refers to capacities distinct from the capacities to which (2) and (3) refer.
References
Amaya, S. (2013). Slips. Noûs, 47(3), 559–576.
Amaya, S., & Doris, J. M. (2014). No excuses: performance mistakes in morality. In J. Clausen & N. Levy (Eds.), The handbook of neuroethics (pp. 253–272). Dordrecht: Springer.
Aron, A. R., & Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Cortical and subcortical contributions to stop signal response inhibition: Role of the subthalamic nucleus. Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 2424–2433.
Aron, A. R., et al. (2007). Triangulating a cognitive control network using diffusion-weighted magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and functional MRI. Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 3743–3752.
Bogacz, R., et al. (2010). The neural basis of the speed-accuracy tradeoff. Trends in Neuroscience, 33, 10–16.
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Conflict monitoring and decision making: Reconciling two perspectives on anterior cingulated function. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 356–366.
Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2014). The computational and neural basis of cognitive control: Charted territory and new frontiers. Cognitive Science, 38(6), 1249–1285.
Cavanagh, J. F., et al. (2011). Subthalamic nucleus stimulation reverses mediofrontal influence over decision threshold. Nature Neuroscience, 14, 1462–1467.
Clarke, R. (2014). Omissions: Responsibility, agency, and metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, R. (2016). Ignorance, revision, and commonsense. In P. Robichaud, J. W. Wieland (Eds.) Responsibility: The epistemic condition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the brain: The mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Doris, J. (2015). Talking to ourselves: Reflection, ignorance, and agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Doris, J., & Stich, S. (2007). As a matter of fact: Empirical perspectives on ethics. In F. Jackson & M. Smith (Eds.), The oxford handbook of contemporary philosophy (pp. 114–152). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ekstrom, L. (2000). Free will: A contemporary study. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fischer, J. M., & Tognazzini, N. (2009). The truth about tracing. Noûs, 43(3), 531–556.
Forstmann, B. U., et al. (2008). Striatum and pre-SMA facilitate decision-making under time pressure. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 105, 17538–17542.
Forstmann, B. U., et al. (2010). Cortico-striatal connections predict control over speed and accuracy in perceptual decision making. Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences USA, 107, 15916–15920.
Frankfurt, H. (1998). Necessity, volition, love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ginet, C. (2000). The epistemic requirements for moral responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives, 14, 267–277.
Graham, P. (2014). A sketch of a theory of moral blameworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2), 388–409.
Ivanoff, J., et al. (2008). fMRI evidence for a dual process account of the speed-accuracy tradeoff in decision-making. PLoS ONE, 3, e2635.
Jahafri, S. (2011). Effective connectivity reveals important roles for both the hyperdirect (fronto-subthalamic) and the indirect (fronto-striatal-palladial) fronto-basal ganglia pathways during response inhibition. Journal of Neuroscience, 31, 6891–6899.
Kerns, J. G. (2006). Anterior cingulated and prefrontal cortex activity in an FMRI study of trial-to-trial adjustments of the Simon task. Neuroimage, 33, 399–405.
King, J. A., et al. (2010). Post-error behavioral adjustments are facilitated by activation and suppression of task-relevant and task-irrelevant information processing. Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 12759–12769.
Kool, W., et al. (2010). Decision making and the avoidance of cognitive demand. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139, 665–682.
Mulder, M. J., et al. (2012). Bias in the brain: A diffusion model analysis of prior probability and potential payoff. Journal of Neuroscience, 32, 2335–2343.
Nelkin, D. K. (2008). Responsibility and rational abilities: Defending an asymmetrical view. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89(4), 497–515.
Nichols, S. (2015). Bound: Essays on free will and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, D. (forthcoming). Omissions and different senses of responsibility. In D. K. Nelkin, & S. C. Rickless (eds.) The ethics and law of omissions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 179–91.
Raz, J. (2011). From normativity to responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosen, G. (2003). Culpability and ignorance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103, 61–84.
Rosen, G. (2004). Skepticism about moral responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives, 18, 295–313.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (2008). Moral dimensions: Permissibility, meaning, and blame. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Shenhav, A., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2013). The expected value of control: An integrative theory of anterior cingulate cortex function. Neuron, 79, 217–240.
Sher, G. (2009). Who knew: Responsibility without awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shoemaker, D. (2015). Responsibility from the margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. (2005). Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life. Ethics, 115(2), 236–271.
Smith, A. (2008). Control, responsibility, and moral assessment. Philosophical Studies, 138, 367–392.
Smith, A. (2015). Attitudes, tracing, and control. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 32(2), 115–132.
Strawson, P. F. (1962). Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 187–211.
Timpe, K. (2011). Tracing and the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. The Modern Schoolman, 88(1–2), 5–28.
van Inwagen, P. (1983). An essay on free will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
van Inwagen, P. (1989). When is the will free? Philosophical Perspectives, 3, 399–422.
van Maanen, L., et al. (2011). Neural correlates of trial-to-trial fluctuations in response caution. Journal of Neuroscience, 31, 17488–17495.
Vargas, M. (2013). Building better beings: A theory of moral responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vargas, M. (ms.). Moral Negligence and Social Self-Governance.
Wallace, R. J. (1994). Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wiecki, T. V., & Frank, M. J. (2013). A computational model of inhibitory control in frontal cortex and basal ganglia. Psychological Review, 120, 329–355.
Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zimmerman, M. (2008). Living with uncertainty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Eleonore Stump, Jon Jacobs, Kevin Timpe, William T. Newsome, John Greco, Philip Swenson, Leigh Vicens, Anne Jeffrey, Fritz Warfield, Peter van Inwagen, Al Mele, John Schwenkler, Angela Smith, E.J. Coffman, Markus Kohl, David Palmer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Murray, Jesse Summers, Adina Roskies, Chandra Sripada, Katrina Sifferd, Holly Smith, Santiago Amaya, and Jorah Dannenberg for discussion and constructive criticism on these ideas. Special thanks to Manuel Vargas, Jonathan D. Cohen, Randy Clarke, Derk Pereboom, and Robert Audi, each of whom read at least one (and sometimes many) different drafts of this paper and provided extremely helpful feedback. Versions of this paper were presented at the 2014 Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Meeting; the 2015 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Moral Responsibility conference at Utah Valley University; the 2015 Tennessee Value and Agency Conference; the 2015 Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Agency Conference at Florida State; and the Stanford Graduate Student Workshop (with special thanks to Robert Bassett for arranging the meeting). All of these meetings proved enormously fruitful and my thanks go to the audience members at each of those meetings for pressing insightful criticisms. Also, thanks to the Moral Attitudes and Decision-Making lab and the Imagination and Modal Cognition lab at Duke University and the Neuroscience of Cognitive Control lab at Princeton University for further discussion of these ideas, particularly the empirical dimensions of the work. I’m grateful to Florida State University for a research grant through the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control project and the Stanford University Neurobiology Department, both of whom funded part of this research.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Murray, S. Responsibility and vigilance. Philos Stud 174, 507–527 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0694-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0694-3