Abstract
In this article, I propose and argue for a conception of inhuman treatment. In the human rights context, I claim, inhuman treatment is that which is grossly degrading. Relative to “cruel,” “inhumane,” and “degrading,” “inhuman” has received little attention from moral philosophers. My aim here is to analyze this concept in greater depth in order to determine what it brings to discussions about punishment and other kinds of treatment. I begin by drawing distinctions between “inhuman,” “inhumane,” and “degrading.” Then, I discuss analyses of “inhuman treatment” proposed by Jeremy Waldron and John Vorhaus. Although I find both conceptions problematic, discussing each helps me to set the stage for my proposal. After articulating and arguing for my own conception, I conclude by briefly explaining some of its implications.
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Notes
Of course, these terms are also used in important national and international documents. For example, see the United Nations “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” (1987). My focus will be on understanding these terms primarily in an ethical context. Analyzing constitutions and treaties can shift the focus and introduce different evaluative criteria. While such a project is worthwhile, it is not my project here.
Quotation from opinion in Ireland v. UK.
Italics are mine. The interpretation of this passage is a bit difficult, and since it appears in a footnote it is not unpacked. However, Kleinig has mentioned in personal communication that his account was intended to be agent-centered.
The phrase “human rights context” is used repeatedly in Waldron’s paper to refer to the social and political context in which claims of “inhuman and degrading treatment” are often made.
Case is Tyrer v. UK.
It might be objected here that I am taking a problematic approach that involves wrongly assuming that social concepts can be analyzed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Should these concepts, on the other hand, be analyzed by pointing out a “core and penumbra,” or by enumerating a cluster of characteristics associated with them? (Kleinig, personal communication) This issue is very complex, and deep consideration of it would take me too far afield. With respect to the particular issue at hand, though, I think that I have made a strong enough case that suffering should not be part of our conception of inhuman treatment.
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Acknowledgment
I would like to thank John Kleinig and Michael Levin for their comments on earlier drafts of this work.
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Murtagh, K.J. What is Inhuman Treatment?. Criminal Law, Philosophy 6, 21–30 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-011-9131-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-011-9131-z