Abstract
An aim of science is to find truths about reality. These truths are collected together to form systematic knowledge structures called theories. Theories are intended to create a truthful picture of the reality behind the study. Together with all the other fields of science we get a (complete) scientific picture or a world view. This scientific world view is open in the sense that not all truths are known by scientists and not all present day theories are true. So, there is no reason to assume that any field of science has been or will be completed; science is essentially progressive, or an open ended approach. Science is not the only method of picturing, but the view that science is the best human method for knowledge acquisition is well justified. Knowledge is not all we humans are looking for; we need to make our lives meaningful. The meaningfulness may be achieved through science, art, or practical activity. It is interesting to compare literature and science. Both are expressed linguistically, but the aims of literature and science seem to be very different. We are looking for the theoretical interconnection between science and literature, but the proper dialogue can be found not through science, literature or philosophy, but through pedagogy.
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Mutanen, A. Pedagogy as a Framework for a Proper Dialogue between Science and Literature. Philosophia 44, 167–180 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9683-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9683-6