Abstract
As late as the mid-1970s the term ‘false consciousness’ was still applied by critical social theorists to instances of ideological delusion. Yet, in the wake of the postmodernist revolution and its neo-Nietzschean declaration of all truths to be merely truth-effects, a concept of false consciousness appeared impossible to sustain. Drawing on an incident in the history of South African politics, this article reconsiders the ways in which a concept of false consciousness, built upon a representational model of truth and falsity, might assist us in explaining the dynamics of ideological contestation.
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Myers, J. The Truth about False Consciousness. Contemp Polit Theory 1, 139–156 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300035
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300035