Alfred Schutz Symposium: The Pregivenness of Sociality

Abstract

It is perhaps a sign of the impact of the work of Alfred Schutz on recent thought that no detailed exposition of his ideas is necessary for this audience. In Schutz’s own language, it is now possible to “take for granted” at least a general acquaintance with his views on the social sciences, the nature of human action, the structure of typification, and the large tapestry of the everyday world of man and fellow man. With a minimum of exposition, I propose to consider a few central themes in his writings, show their interrelationships in the logic of Schutz’s position, and go on to speculate on their implications for a theory of the social world. Part of the discussion will remain close to Schutz’s formulations; part will move on the periphery of this thought; and part will proceed independently, though mindful of his accomplishment. I do not believe there will be any confusion about where I speak with Schutz and where I speak for myself: the shakier the ground, the greater my autonomy.

I begin with a recollection which I ask you to accept as a motif for my paper. In one of the first discussions I had with Alfred Schutz—it was in 1951—I raised a question about a point in his essay “On Multiple Realities” and said something like: “… but in your philosophy….” The expression on his face stopped me at once: he was scandalized and amused. “In my what?” he asked. It was the first time that repeating the word “philosophy” left me with a sense of its weakness when it is spoken of anything less than original and fundamental accomplishment. Schutz went on to say that after twenty-five years of phenomenological work he had not yet begun to approach what might truly be called “his philosophy.”