Abstract
In this paper, we will discuss solipsism and the limits of experience in the light of Wittgenstein’s TLP. One cannot draw the limits of experience without bringing in the notion of the experiencer. That is to say, the notion of self is very relevant to the discussion on the limits of experience. Solipsism means that ‘I’ is the only reality, and what I experience is all that I could know. We will focus on solipsism from two points of view, the empirical point of view and the transcendental point of view. The empirical approach to solipsism makes the self as a matter of its experience. However, from the transcendental point of view, the transcendental or metaphysical self becomes the transcendental ground of our experiences. In the second section, we will discuss the relationship between solipsism and realism. Then how the self is related to the world will be discussed in the third section. For Wittgenstein, the self ‘I' is neither causally nor logically related to the world. This self is the metaphysical subject, and it is the limit of the world. In the fourth section, we will discuss the importance of the limit-self. The limit-self is not the matter or object of experience; rather, it is the ground of our world's experience. For Wittgenstein, it is not an item of the world; rather, it is the limit of the world. The limit-self cannot be described in language, and thus it is beyond our language. It is the limit of our language and also the limit of the world. Then, we will critically analyze the limit of experience, and the metaphysical self is placed on the limit of experience. This self is the non-solipsistic self.
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Schopenhauer (1883, p. 25).
Wittgenstein (1961a, Remarks 5.621).
Schopenhauer (1883, p. 26).
Schroeder (2012, pp. 367–384).
Māndukya Upaniśhad (2020).
Nath (2017).
Schopenhauer (1969, p. 110).
Pathak (2017).
Pradhan (2017).
Indich (1980, pp. 29–35).
Gupta (2003).
Schroeder (2006, pp. 92–99).
Wittgenstein (1961, Remarks 4.12).
Ibid., Remarks 5.5561.
Ibid., Remarks 5.5423.
Ibid., Remarks 5.6.
Ibid., Remarks 5.62.
Ibid., Remarks 5.641.
Ibid., Remarks 5.631.
Ibid., Remarks 5.633.
Ibid., Remarks 5.632.
Ibid., Remarks 5.5521.
Ibid., Remarks 1.1.
Ibid., Remarks 5.5561.
Ibid., Remarks 5.61.
Ibid.
Pradhan (2002, p. 309).
Ibid., p. 300.
Pradhan (2009, pp. 149–166).
Wittgenstein (1961, Remarks 5.641).
Ibid., Remarks 5.631.
Chandra (2002, p. 80).
Wittgenstein (1982, p. 80).
Wittgenstein (1975a, Remarks 54).
Wittgenstein (1975b, p. 59).
Ibid., pp. 59–60.
See, Findly (1984, pp. 122–124).
Wittgenstein (1975a, Remarks 54).
Putnam (2012, pp. 339–354).
Wittgenstein (1961, Remarks 5.64).
Ibid., Remarks 5.621.
Wittgenstein (1958, Sections: 398).
Wittgenstein (1961, Remarks 5.64).
Chandra (2002, p. 66).
Hume (1978, p. 252).
Hacker (1972, p. 59).
Hume (1978, p. 252).
Wittgenstein (1961b, p. 80).
Swann (1992).
Pears (1987, p. 172).
Pears (1972).
Wittgenstein (1961, Remarks 6.423).
Ibid., Remarks 5.641.
Ibid., Remarks 5.552.
Stephenson (2009, p. 123).
Ibid., p.123.
Wittgenstein (1961, Remarks 5.634).
Stephenson (2009, p. 123).
Wittgenstein (1961, Remarks 5.6).
Martland (1975).
Wittgenstein (1958, Sections: 256–257).
Panda and Nath (2020).
Wittgenstein (1982, p. 22).
Ibid., p. 21.
Vohra (2014, pp. 35–62).
Wittgenstein (1982, p. 22).
Wittgenstein (1975b, p. 59).
Wittgenstein (1958, Sections: 398).
Chandra (2002, p. 78).
Hintikka (1958, p. 89).
Wittgenstein (1958, Sects. 253).
Hacker (1972, p. 189).
Wittgenstein (1975b, p. 55).
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Nath, R., Panda, M.M. From Solipsism to the Limits of Experience: A Reflection in the Light of Wittgenstein’s TLP. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 41, 17–36 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-023-00318-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-023-00318-9