Reality is a game, but you shouldn't take a game for reality
(Pragmaticist Proverb)
Abstract
This paper discusses the results of a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma computer tournament. In the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma tournament each pair of players interacts only once. But players can establish and detect reputations because they know how their current opponent has behaved in previous games with other players. The results show that cooperation is worthwhile, even in single-shot games, provided the outcomes of previous games are common knowledge.
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Nauta, D., Hoekstra, J. Effective choice in the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma tournament. Theor Decis 39, 1–30 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01078867
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01078867