Abstract
Following Kant, it is clear that, but probably not completely how we are morally obligated. I will point out that there are three possible ways to struggle for an understanding of how we can be obligated as rational beings and also as ordinary human beings. There is (a) the argument from rational feeling (‘Achtung’), (b) the argument from language, and finally (c) the argument from systematization. Reading the later passages of the ‘Critique of pure Reason’ and following its instructions, we will understand why education has to be founded by the same kind of argumentation as the natural sciences. The systematical analysis of Kant’s analogy between the physical body and the moral obligation will explain the suspected gap between our just rational and our whole selves. The most important part of the demanded bridge will be Kant’s Moral Laboratory.
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Notes
Kant’s writings are cited with reference to the Academy Edition (‘A vol. p.’).
The three ways mentioned by Johannes Schur are situated on a completely different level (Schurr 1983). He tries to associate some ideas on education employing the terminology of the ‘Critique of pure Reason’, ignoring anything Kant himself has stated about these matters.
The English titles of the books I am going to refer to in the next paragraphs hide the analogy among them. In German the ‘Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science’ and the two volumes of the ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ are all entitled ‘Metaphysische Anfangsgründe’.
The hypotyposes are—so to say—the most detailed explanations of what is going on in one’s mind from a transcendental point of view. They explain the subject’s acting concerning sensual data when it comes to imaginations (i.e. complexes of concepts and intuitions) on any level from single objects up to very abstract conclusions that base on sensual data in the beginning, beautiful/sublime works of art or formations in nature or history ending up at very complex logical systems of thought. The hypotyposes are opposed to the maxims which define the subjective end of an action in principle. In case of theoretical philosophy such an end would be the unity of any understanding or the world as if there was a complete teleology for instance (a speculative super-system); in case of practical philosophy it would be a maxim called imperative. If the subject keeps within its own domain of dignity, it turns out to be a categorical imperative (for the basic meaning of categorical is almost only: with respect to a subject term in a logical conclusion). Thus an imperative is a sole top-down principle working exactly the same as speculation concludes all appearing objects under one principle: the imperative requires the agent to conclude the formal end-means-complex (maxim) under that one principle of autonomy or heteronomy. But as this principle comes first ignoring whether there will be any action taking place ever or not (like the idea of the world would still remain even if there was no cognition of a physical world ever) the imperative is a sole top-down principle neither being able to compromise nor able to suspend for a priori reason given in the features of the hypotyposes-maxim-relation discovered in the ‘Critique of pure Reason’ (see the Appendix of the Transcendental Dialectics: Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason; see Nawrath 2009).
‘First Principles’ is already a much better translation than ‘Foundation’, but it still does not match the meaning of ‘Anfangsgründe’ as principles of transition. Such principles of transition can only be considered as knowledge a priori although their actual cognition depends on an appearance. Therefore Kant himself called his method within such ‘Anfangsgründe’ a “Phänomenologie”: that what appears (A4, p. 560n).
David James is one of the few discussing this problem of casuistic questions at all. He even finds the concept of a collision/conflict (James 1992, p. 74). But after all he misses the correct entrance to this discussion since he starts with the maxim about maxims method, ignoring the basic structure of any ‘Metaphysische Anfangsgründe’ which’s systematic issue is to present a sustaining aspect. Instead, James claims that such a sustaining character was a reason to criticize Kant’s work (James 1992, p. 84). See also Walter Okshevsky (Okshevsky 2000).
This is also intended to take up the ‘one thought too many’ objection (Bernard Williams). If this second stage was Kant’s final idea, this objection would make an important point indeed. But Kant has not only presented a reflexive formula, but also such a phenomenology heading for virtues and ordinary life. The causes that lie behind this misunderstanding seem to have confused a distinct principle and a question of clear deciding or acting. Neither the ‘Groundwork’ nor the ‘Critique of practical Reason’ presents such a clear approach but only the distinct argument (and anticipates examples) according to the business of a ‘critique’ (see CpuR A, p. xv-xix).
These problems are only derivatives of the ones Socrates addressed when he ‘proved’ that the soul is both immortal (consequently not to die) and everlasting (completely not to vanish); see Plato: Phaedo, st. 106b.
Of course most of the ancient and very modern physics is not discovered in a stereotype laboratory but within someone’s head. Nevertheless the idea of a laboratory marks a border between everyday experience and the reflexive reasoning for causes, structures, and so forth. This kind of reasoning is neither part of any application nor of any ontological demonstration what the world in itself might be. It is about a concrete question, but not an individual case.
Scholars who are more interested in cultures than in societies might be more convinced of the parallel argument of Kant concerning another process marked by the four steps of gaining discipline, culture, civilization and morality which I cannot discuss in this brief paper at length (A9, p. 449f): Discipline is presented as a condition sine qua non of morality, but the disciplining force is only justified within a framework of culture. Next, culture can only be justified if it supports a civilization of `enlightenment’. Although this will be diverse for each people and age, the requirement of respect for reason in general will remain (A8, p. 36). Finally reason only makes sense if and only if it is treated as an indicator of autonomy, dignity and freedom, i.e. the framework of Kantian ethics and the interpretation of morality as living in accordance with the categorical imperative at each of these levels. Again the substantial idea of freedom given in the concept of the categorical imperative is the headstone of the whole phenomenology.
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Nawrath, T. The Moral Laboratory: On Kant’s Notion of Pedagogy as a Science. Stud Philos Educ 29, 365–377 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-010-9186-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-010-9186-7