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Misrepresenting & malfunctioning

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Program Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 0200, Canberra, Australia

    Karen Neander

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  1. Karen Neander
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Additional information

This paper has gone through a number of drafts, and an early version was first presented at the Australasian Philosophy Conference, Melbourne, July 1991. It has benefited from discussions with many people, and I am especially grateful to my colleagues at the ANU, RSSS, and to the staff and students at Rutgers University. I am much indebted to Georges Rey, for his invaluable comments on several drafts, and to Ruth Millikan for some very enjoyable and useful discussions during The Blizzard of '93.

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Neander, K. Misrepresenting & malfunctioning. Philos Stud 79, 109–141 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989706

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