Abstract
In On Certainty, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forth a unique defense against skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, “we just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.” These hinges provide the necessary framework for epistemic evaluation. The question is how to understand Wittgenstein’s language here. Duncan Pritchard puts forward a non-belief reading whereby one has a non-belief propositional attitude towards hinge propositions. In this paper, I explain Pritchard’s reading of Wittgenstein before attacking it with an argument premised upon our ability to doubt hinge propositions. If we can doubt hinge propositions, then, according to a view of doubt defended by Andrew Moon, we can believe that ~ p is possible. And, if we can believe that ~ p is possible, then we can believe that p. I walk through a defense of each premise in this argument, which shows that Pritchard’s reading fails. I conclude by responding to some potential objections, which allow us to distinguish between two types of doubt: rational and psychological.
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Notes
It is worth noting that Pritchard has a slightly more developed view since Epistemic Angst. He still thinks that you cannot believe hinge commitments—which is the claim that I am targeting—but he has developed an account of what exactly that non-belief propositional attitude is. He thinks that one can be convinced of a hinge commitment, making conviction that p the propositional attitude that one has towards hinge commitments. For defenses of this view, see Pritchard (2018a, b). This updated view should not impact my argument, as my argument targets a claim that Pritchard still holds, which is that the propositional attitude we have towards hinge commitments is not belief. Thank you to a referee for this journal for noting the importance of mentioning this updated view.
The type of possibility considered in the consequent of (2) and the antecedent of (3) is epistemic possibility.
It is worth noting here that Pritchard’s Wittgenstenian account holds that doubt of hinge commitments is impossible, such that the type of doubt that I consider plausible in the cases mentioned is in an important sense fake. I respond to the claim that doubt of hinge commitments is impossible and the claim that we only seem to doubt hinge commitments in section III. Thank you to a referee of this journal for suggesting noting this objection here.
In this section, I will be presenting just a brief summary of Moon’s distinction, puzzle, and argument, which are all fleshed out in greater detail in his paper.
The possibility being considered in “it is possible that ~ p” is epistemic possibility.
When he refers to ‘Moorean certainties’ here, he is talking about hinge commitments. Emphasis added.
Thus, “psychological doubt” here is a term of art for whatever is picked out by the mass form of doubt. One can understand psychological doubt as a phenomenology of doubt, but strictly speaking one can have psychological doubt without the phenomenology of doubt. For a defense of this, see Moon (2018, pp. 1831–1832). The important point here is that if one has a phenomenology of doubt about p, then one has psychological doubt about p. I am thankful to a referee of this journal for pointing out the need to make this clear.
In addition, Pritchard says “At the very least, what Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting in this passage is that there could be no rational basis that would mandate doubt of a Moorean certainty” and discusses how rational evaluation depends upon this inability to doubt (p. 65–66).
Other hinge theorists seem to also be talking about epistemic doubt when they discuss this. Annalisa Coliva makes this explicit. “Their [hinge commitments’] certainty is of a ‘grammatical’ (or even ‘logical’) nature (provided ‘logic’ and ‘grammar’ are taken as synonyms), not of a psychological, or animal one. The reason why we can’t doubt them, that is, is not because we find it difficult or even impossible given the kind of creatures we are and the upbringing we have been subject to. Rather, the reason why we can’t doubt them is that there can’t actually be reasons to do so.” Coliva (2016, p. 88).
I am thankful to a referee of this journal for pressing the need to make this clear.
My claim is not that the phenomenology of mental states allows for an infallible way to differentiate them from each other, but rather than the phenomenology of mental states can serve as a rational basis for knowledge about one’s mental states in at least some cases. It is this second claim which it seems Pritchard would be forced to deny.
Thank you to a referee of this journal for pointing out this objection. It is also worth noting how those beliefs in hinge commitments could be rational. There are a number of theories that can provide us with an account of how our belief in hinge commitments could be rational, including reliabilism, proper functionalism, and direct realism. Since these views do not make an important distinction between how we come to believe hinge commitments and how we come to believe non-hinge commitments, they can explain how we can rationally believe hinge commitments. See Goldman (1979), Plantinga (1993), and Huemer (2001), respectively.
I see this is a potential problem in Pritchard (2018a). He argues that one conviction is not a belief, because it is entirely unresponsive to reason, but says later that a hinge commitment can be indirectly reasons-responsive. Thus, the hinge commitment does not meet his standard for failing to be a belief.
Thank you to John Greco and Andrew Moon for helpful comments that helped this paper in many ways.
References
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Nebel, J. Doubting Pritchard’s account of hinge propositions. Synthese 198, 5101–5113 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02392-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02392-6