Abstract
The concept of God is studied using the ontological argument of Anselm of Canterbury that proves God’s existence using a syllogism based on ontology. Unlike metaphysical arguments that demonstrate the existence of God through the study of being and its attributes, the ontological argument aims to reach this same goal based on a concept of God by means of the idea of an entity “greater than anything that can be conceived”. Descartes’ influence highlighted some of the philosophical difficulties with the inherent dualism implicit in ontology. Logic does not say whether ideas are true or false, as Logic is concerned with right or wrong inference. We take a non-dualist approach in contrast to some of the approaches reviewed. To investigate belief and faith, a modal logical formalization is used, especially modal logic S5, which we find appropriate for presenting arguments. While mathematics and logic can convince, they do not help one to believe in God. This can make us think that reason is not enough to accept God, one must have faith to have access to Him. The relation between reason and faith needs clarification, and the ontological argument requires an unsustainable dualism.
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Juan de Santo Tomás O.P. (1589–1644) was a Portuguese priest, philosopher and theologian of the second scholastic period at the School of Salamanca, and confessor to the Spanish King Philip IV.
Spanish theologian and religious Jesuit author of a controversial theory that historiography called "molinism", which sought to reconcile divine omnipotence and human freedom. Born in Cuenca (Spain), in 1553 he entered the Jesuits. He went to Portugal, where he spent much of his life, and completed philosophical studies. From 1563 to 1567 he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Coimbra and in 1568 went to the University of Évora, where he taught theology until 1583. He then became Professor of Moral Theology at Imperial College in Madrid where he died on October 12, 1600.
In modal logic, an accessibility relation is a binary relation, written as R between possible worlds.
«Omnimodo maior et melior est, quam quidquid non est quod ipsa» Anselm of Canterbury. Monologio. Chapter 15.
«aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari possit» Anselm of Canterbury, Monologio.
Begging the Question, Circular Reasoning, Reasoning in a Circle or Petitio Principii, is a fallacy in which the premises include the claim that the conclusion is true or (directly or indirectly) assume that the conclusion is true. This sort of "reasoning" typically has the following form.
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Premises in which the truth of the conclusion is claimed, or the truth of the conclusion is assumed (either directly or indirectly).
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Claim C (the conclusion) is true.
This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because simply assuming that the conclusion is true (directly or indirectly) in the premises does not constitute evidence for that conclusion. Obviously, simply assuming a claim is true does not serve as evidence for that claim. This is especially clear in particularly blatant cases: "X is true. The evidence for this claim is that X is true." Some cases of question begging are fairly blatant, while others can be extremely subtle.
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1.
The dichotomy between the/a, comes from the ambiguity arising when translating the Latin text, that lacks articles and the expression ens primun et summum can be translated as "a first and supreme being" or "the being first and supreme".
In philosophy, noetics is a branch of Metaphysics concerned with the study of mind and intellect. Noetic topics include the doctrine of the agent/patient intellect (Aristotle, Averroes) and the doctrine of the Divine Intellect (Plotinus).
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Nescolarde-Selva, J., Usó-Doménech, J.L. & Gash, H. Belief, Knowledge and Faith: A Logical Modal Theory. Found Sci 26, 453–474 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09677-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09677-x