Abstract
The mainstream science of consciousness offers a few predominate views of how the brain gives rise to awareness. Chief among these are the Higher-Order Thought Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and hybrids thereof. In parallel, rapid development in predictive processing approaches have begun to outline concrete mechanisms by which interoceptive inference shapes selfhood, affect, and exteroceptive perception. Here, we consider these new approaches in terms of what they might offer our empirical, phenomenological, and philosophical understanding of consciousness and its neurobiological roots.
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Notes
invert here is using the technical (Bayesian sense) and refers to the inverse mapping between consequences and causes afforded by a generative model where causes generate consequences. In short, inverting a generative model means inferring the (hidden) causes of (observable) consequences.
‘Entail’ is used carefully here to acknowledge that the generative model is a mathematical construct, not something that is physically realized: neuronal processes can be understood as minimizing free energy that is a function of a generative model; however, neuronal dynamics that are realized reflect free energy gradients (that can be cast as a prediction error), not the free energy per se.
The updating of the precision of prediction errors is generally read as sensory attention or attenuation (Brown, H., R. A. Adams, I. Parees, M. Edwards and K. Friston (2013). “Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions.” Cogn Process 14(4): 411–427). This speaks to an intimate link between conscious (interception-pointing) inference and attentional selection – or sensory attenuation.
A gradient flow is simply a description of states that change in the direction of steepest descent on some function of their current value; here, variational free energy.
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MA and NN are supported by a Lundbeckfonden Fellowship (under Grant [R272–2017-4345]), and the AIAS-COFUND II fellowship programme that is supported by the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 (under Grant [754513]), and the Aarhus University Research Foundation. KJF was funded by a Wellcome Trust Principal Research Fellowship (Ref: 088130/Z/09/Z).
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Nikolova, N., Waade, P.T., Friston, K.J. et al. What Might Interoceptive Inference Reveal about Consciousness?. Rev.Phil.Psych. 13, 879–906 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00580-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00580-3