Is Our Self Temporal? From the Temporal Features of the Brain’s Neural Activity to Self-Continuity and Personal Identity

Abstract

There is much discussion about the concept of self and its relation to personal identity in both philosophy and neuroscience. I here propose a “spatiotemporal model” of identity that is based on various empirical findings in recent neuroscience. I propose that the temporal features of identity as pointed out in my spatiotemporal model provide the temporal ground of the self and its continuity over time on the basis of the scale-free and temporally-structured neuronal activity in the brain’s spontaneous activity in cortical midline structures. Moreover, I characterize such self-continuity by spatiotemporal memory that encodes spatial and temporal structures signifying events as distinguished from the encoding of contents as in a cognitive memory. I conclude that such spatiotemporal model of self and personal identity does not only provide a proper conceptual account of the empirical data but also novel conceptualizations that are relevant to the philosophical discussion.