Abstract
Resolution-oriented dialogue has a normative structure that is largely subject to theoretical explication. This paper develops a simple model that sheds light on how moves in a reason-giving game alter the distribution of discursive commitments and entitlements. By clarifying the practice of deontic scorekeeping, we can enhance our collective capacity to resolve conflicts dialogically.
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Norman, A. The Normative Structure of Adjudicative Dialogue. Argumentation 15, 489–498 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012089915599
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012089915599