Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Defeasible Logic and The Frame Problem

  • Chapter
Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning

Part of the book series: Studies in Cognitive Systems ((COGS,volume 5))

Abstract

McCarthy and Hayes [McCarthy&Hayes69] originally applied the term “frame problem” to a specific puzzle about knowledge representation. Hayes [Hayes87] distinguished the original frame problem from a growing number of related problems that have been called the frame problem:

One feels that there should be some economical and principled way of succinctly saying what changes an action makes, without having to explicitly list all the things it doesn’t change as well; yet there doesn’t seem to be any other way to do it. That is the frame problem. If there are 100 actions, and 500 labile properties and relations, then we might need 50,000 of these silly ‘frame axioms’....(p. 125)

Wherever I use the expression “the frame problem” in the rest of this paper, I will have this original version of the problem in mind.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Bibliography

  • Billington, D., De Coster, K., and Nute, D. “A modular translation from defeasible nets to defeasible logics,” Computing and Information Technology Research Report 31, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia: Griffeth University. Also appears as Artificial Intelligence Programs Research Report AI-1989–05, Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanks, S., and McDermott, D. “ Default reasoning, non-monotonic logics, and the frame problem,” Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Morgan-Kaufman, pp. 328–333, 1986.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanks, S., and McDermott, D. “Default logic and temporal projection,” Artificial Intelligence 33, pp. 379–413, 1987.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Hayes, P. “What the frame problem is and isn’t,” The Robot’s Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence, Z. Pylyshyn, ed., Ablex, pp. 123–138, 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loui, R. “Response to Hanks and McDermott: temporal evolution of beliefs and beliefs about temporal evolution.” Cognitive Science 11, pp. 303–317, 1987.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCarthy, J. “Circumscription–a form of non-monotonic reasoning,” Artificial Intelligence 13, pp. 27–39, 1980.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • McCarthy, J., and Hayes, P. “Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence,” Machine Intelligence 4, B. Meltzer and D. Michie, ed., Edinburgh University Press, pp. 463–502, 1969.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDermott, D. “A temporal logic for reasoning about processes and plans,” Cognitive Science 6, pp. 101–155, 1982.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McDermott, D. “We’ve been framed: or, why AI is innocent of the frame problem,” The Robot’s Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence, Z. Pylyshyn, ed., Ablex, pp. 113–122, 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDermott, D., and J. Doyle. “Non-monotonic logic I,” Artificial Intelligence 13, pp. 41–72, 1980.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Nute, D. “Defeasible reasoning and decision support systems,” Decision Support Systems: The International Journal 4, pp. 97–110, 1988.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nute, D. “Defeasible reasoning: a philosophical analysis in Prolog,” in J. Fetzer, ed., Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, Kluwer, pp. 251–288, 1988a.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Nute, D., and M. Lewis. “A user’s manual for d-Prolog,” ACMC Research Report 01–0016, Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia, 1986.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nute, D., Mann, R., and B. Brewer. “ Using defeasible logic to control selection of a business forecasting method,” Proceedings of the 21st Hawaii International Conference on System Science, Washington: IEEE Computer Society, pp. 437–444, 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  • Poole, D. “On the comparison of theories: preferring the most specific explanation,”IJCAI-85: Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Los Angeles, Morgan-Kaufmann, pp. 144–147, 1985.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reiter, R. “A logic for default reasoning,” Artificial Intelligence 13, pp. 81132, 1980.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Donald Nute
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Departments of Philosophy and Computer Science, University of Rochester, USA

    Henry E. Kyburg Jr.

  2. Department of Computer Science, Washington University, USA

    Ronald P. Loui

  3. Department of Foreign Languages, University of Rochester, USA

    Greg N. Carlson

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Nute, D. (1990). Defeasible Logic and The Frame Problem. In: Kyburg, H.E., Loui, R.P., Carlson, G.N. (eds) Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0553-5_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0553-5_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6736-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-0553-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation