Abstract
The characterization of the world of the ancient Greek city states as relatively poor and economically static has been refuted by recent advances in Greek economic history. The Greek world grew dramatically, compared to other premodern societies, both in population and per capita consumption from the age of Homer to that of Aristotle. By the fourth century BCE the city-state ecology was densely populated, and median consumption was well above bare subsistence. Athenian income inequality can be roughly measured using income and population estimates from late fourth century BCE. This paper argues that, at least in Athens, economic growth was accompanied by historically low levels of income inequality. Both economic growth and low inequality are explained by the development of citizen-centered political institutions. Growth, inequality, and institutions were important parts of the historical context in which Plato and Aristotle wrote. Attending to that context may elucidate some aspects of Greek political philosophy.
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Notes
- 1.
For a comprehensive survey of inequality in world history, see now Scheidel (2017). Some of the material in this chapter is adapted and updated from chapters 4 and 5 of Ober (2015a). Section 2.3 offers an abbreviated survey of results reported more fully in Ober (2017). I am indebted to Claire Taylor, Ian Morris , Walter Scheidel , Mirko Canevaro, David Lewis, Rob Fleck, Andy Hanssen, and Federica Carugati and to the organizers and participants in the UC San Diego conference for discussions and shared work in progress related to the issues addressed in this paper.
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The alternative demographic standard for measuring urbanization is the percentage of total population living in cities over 10,000. Based on de Vries’ (1984, p. 39, table 3.7) figures for European urbanization in 1600 (at the 10,000+ standard), Hellas was comparable to Holland (24.3%: 19 cities; de Vries 1984, table 3.1), which was the most urbanized part of Europe in 1600. Hellas was substantially more urbanized at the 10,000+ standard than any other European region in 1600: Northern Italy = 16.6% (30 cities); Mediterranean = 13.7% (101 cities); Europe overall = 7.6% (220 cities).
- 6.
Population growth leads to substantially lower living standards in most of the cities of Europe in 1500–1800: Allen (2001) and Deaton (2013, pp. 94–95). Disease: Scheidel (2007). Squalid conditions in the advanced economies of England and Holland: Kron (forthcoming). Greek life expectancy: Morris (2004, pp. 714–720), Kron (2005), and Reden (2007, pp. 388–390). Improved life expectancy for those surviving childhood: Morris (2004, p. 715, figure 2)
- 7.
It is important to keep in mind that the overall Gini wealth index for Athenian society as a whole, including slaves and metics, would surely be substantially higher—I cannot say how much higher because I know no way to calculate wealth of metics or slaves. Wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, is typically much higher than income inequality, considered below.
- 8.
As Claire Taylor has pointed out to me, Morris misreported the Gini coefficient as 0.382–0.386, whereas it is actually c. 0.48 (taking the figure of 9% owning 35% of the land). But Morris’ general point remains valid. For example, in late eleventh century Song Dynasty China, an era in which real wages were higher and inequality was lower than in other periods in premodern Chinese history, the wealthiest 5% of the population is believed to have controlled 24% of the land and 34.3% of the population was landless, yielding a Gini coefficient of 0.50. Data from Liu (2015, pp. 127–133).
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By way of early modern comparisons, Milanovic et al. (2011, table 2) report the income Gini for Tuscany in 1427 = 0.46; Holland in 1561 = 0.56; England and Wales in 1688 = 0.45; France in 1788 = 0.56.
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List and Speikermann (2013) demonstrates that a methodological focus on individuals as choice-making agents (in the form of “supervenience individualism”) is compatible with some forms of causal-explanatory “holism” in respect to considering institutions as collective actors. My two hypotheses assume that their compatibility thesis is correct.
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Emergence and the relationship between micro-level and high-level phenomena: Petitot (2010).
- 16.
My neologistic phrase “rule egalitarianism” (conceptually similar to what North et al. 2009 call “impersonality”) is modeled on the term “rule consequentialism,” commonly used by ethicists. The rule consequentialist focuses on social rules (as opposed to individual acts) that will maximize aggregate welfare (or alternatively, aggregate preference satisfaction).
- 17.
There is, of course, a good deal of specialization in centralized hierarchies—the complex monarchical civilizations of, e.g., Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Persia, would have not been possible without specialists. Yet hierarchies are relatively inefficient in allocating specialist training to individuals across the relevant population based on aptitude and motivation.
- 18.
Bankruptcy laws that limit personal losses, and rules of incorporation that protect individual investors, are familiar modern examples. Patron-client relationships and voluntary associations (e.g., burial societies) provided alternative, civil society, routes to similar ends in some ancient societies.
- 19.
Gallant (1991) assumes high levels of risk aversion on the part of ancient Greek subsistence farmers and suggests possible family risk-buffering strategies, based in part on evidence from subsistence farming in early modern Greece. But, if the arguments presented here are correct, the classical Greek economy was not predicated on the risk-aversion of families of subsistence farmers. Public insurance and risk: Burke (2005), Möller (2007, pp. 375–383), and Ober (2008, pp. 254–258). Mackil (2004) shows how which a somewhat similar risk insurance mechanism operated in some inter-polis relations.
- 20.
This passage is discussed in more detail in Ober (2015a, chapter 7).
- 21.
Strategic calculation based on formal rationality in Greek thought: Ober (2009). Compare North et al. (2009), who emphasize the behavioral implications of individuals being treated impersonally in institutional contexts. Note that I assume here not only formal equality of standing, but also some degree of freedom of choice in respect to occupation. Obviously in practice the extent of free choice varied considerably, but it is the overall effect of differences in opportunities and incentives that produces the result of relatively greater investment in human capital. See also Ober (2012).
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Whether the women themselves would have concurred with Socrates’ assessment, we cannot say.
- 23.
On the development of theories and practices of expertise in the Greek world, see Pyzyk (2015).
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Greek egalitarianism: Cartledge (1996), Morris (1996), and Raaflaub (1996). Runciman (1990) emphasizes the historically remarkable level of Greek egalitarianism. Foxhall (2002, p. 218), by contrast, regards “substantial inequalities in landholding ” as a “paradox” that “I have never been able to resolve in my own mind.” The paradox arises, of course, if one supposes that egalitarianism requires either equal outcomes or equal opportunities (measured by equal access to all valuable resources). But, per above, rule egalitarianism assumes neither.
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This sort of investment in political, rather than specifically economic, skills may be a driver of increased use of slaves and other forms of unfree labor (Scheidel 2008, pp. 115–123). On the other hand, Xenophon (Memorabilia. 3.4) points out that that certain skills required for success in private business affairs are also valuable for managing public affairs (see Sobak 2015). Public goods are in general non-rival (i.e., not a fixed quantity, so that that their use is not subject to zero-sum competition) and non-exclusionary (i.e., all relevant persons have free access).
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For more on such modern impediments, see Laitin (2007).
- 37.
Innovative adaptations of the institution of coined money is a good case in point; for some particularly interesting innovations in this domain, see Mackil and van Alfen (2006).
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Ober, J. (2018). Institutions, Growth, and Inequality in Ancient Greece. In: Anagnostopoulos, G., Santas, G. (eds) Democracy, Justice, and Equality in Ancient Greece. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 132. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96313-6_2
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