Abstract
I argue that the two parts of the B Transcendental Deduction (TD) exhibit inter-dependence in both directions. Two part one claims depend upon the givenness of a unified intuition, thus calling for an account of the unity of sensible intuitions in part two. But the necessity of the synthetic unity of apperception for the unity of representations (part one) is applicable to sensible intuitions in part two. The Transcendental Synthesis of the Imagination in part two is key to showing that the understanding’s spontaneity introduces unity into the sensible manifold, and that this manifold does not already have a unity independent of that of apperception. I clarify the nature of this synthesis and the key role played by inner sense in unifying sensible intuitions. I explain the roles of the forms of time and space and their unicities, as well as the reason why Kant examines selfknowledge in part two.
