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Beyond Motivation and Metaphor: ‘Scientific Passions’ and Anthropomorphism

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EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science

Abstract

We align with other challenges to the idea that emotion-free science, even in principle, is a productive scientific value. We emphasize that emotion can be seen to have important functional benefits for the research scientist and the wider science. Here we analyze the function of anthropomorphic expressions from practicing bioengineering scientists and claim that anthropomorphisms can be an indirect or roundabout indicator of emotional experience. We claim that the attribution of emotional states through anthropomorphism contributes to the motivation, interest, and attention of the researcher and may carry implications of agency, such that objects central to problem solving are imbued with agency and transformed into working partners with the research scientist in cognitive practices toward shared and individual problem solving goals.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Our notion of cognitive partnering might appear to be the same as that of the “actor network” introduced by Bruno Latour (1987). There are significant differences between ‘partners’ and ‘actors’. First, unlike Latour’s actors, not all partners are equal. Human partners (agents) ascribe agency to salient artifacts, but true agency (on our view) requires intentionality, and so artifacts can perform cognitive functions in the system and exhibit independent behaviors, but are not themselves agents.

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Acknowledgement

This research was supported by the US National Science Foundation grants REC0106733, DRL0411825, DRL097394084.

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Correspondence to Lisa M. Osbeck .

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Osbeck, L.M., Nersessian, N.J. (2013). Beyond Motivation and Metaphor: ‘Scientific Passions’ and Anthropomorphism. In: Karakostas, V., Dieks, D. (eds) EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_37

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