Abstract
The second analogy of experience is one of the most famous and crucial parts of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Despite 220 years of intense scrutiny and debate, however, no consensus has emerged as to the precise nature of its argument. A main source of disagreement in recent years has been the following question: With what is Kant concerned in this section? Is he concerned with (1) necessary conditions of our believing in the first place that there has been a case of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession? Is he concerned, in other words, with necessary conditions of our at least seeming to be aware or having any representation at all (whether veridical or not) of an event? Or is he concerned merely with (2) conditions under which alone beliefs of some sort can be verified or confirmed? The second of these possibilities has found its most eloquent champion in Paul Guyer; the first has been defended with great ingenuity by Beatrice Longuenesse.
© Walter de Gruyter
