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Public egos: constructing a Sartrean theory of (inter)personal relations

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Abstract

Sartre’s conception of “the look” creates an ontological conflict with no real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego (1936) one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonal relations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, as well as believing too much in some deep “I” or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets “magically” reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable “I”; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of (inter)personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better (through the look), with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core.

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Notes

  1. cf. Van der Wielen (2014).

  2. cf. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 314/330).

  3. Visker (1999, p. 334).

  4. cf. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 314/330).

  5. cf. ibid., pp. 386–401/404–419.

  6. cf. ibid., pp. 385, 401–434/403, 419–453.

  7. In this sense, “intersubjectivity” here refers to Sartre’s ontological plane, where one’s being-for-another is ontologically constituted by the big, general “Other”—i.e. the a priori principle of intersubjectivity (or alterity) as such. Here one is either a subject “looking,” or an object “being-looked-at.” This “seesaw” can be manifested in many worldly phenomena, but it might not be as prevalent as many suppose. Considering this, I reserve the term “(inter)personality” for relations that play themselves out between and above these ontological extremes. Therefore: everyday physical looks, although made possible by the look, do not always imbue the latter, as we hope to make clear in the following. For more clarity on this distinction, again cf. Van der Wielen J. (2014).

  8. cf. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 306/322).

  9. Again thanks to J. Van der Wielen.

  10. cf. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 35/118–119).

  11. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 284/299). Translation modified—«le moi vient hanter la conscience irréfléchie».

  12. cf. ibid., pp. 127/139.

  13. ibid., pp. 385/403.

  14. cf. ibid., pp. 282–284/298–299.

  15. Discounting the bad faith hybrid of “pride” or “vanity”—cf. ibid., pp. 314/330.

  16. cf. ibid., pp. 97–103/109–115.

  17. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 127/139).

  18. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 128/141).

  19. ibid. Translation modified—«cette «moiïté» du monde est une structure fugitive et toujours présente que je vis. Le monde (est) mien parce qu’il est hanté par des possibles […] que je suis et ce sont ces possibles en tant que tels qui lui donnent son unité et son sens de monde.».

  20. Thus I do not share the same problem that a recent article by Renaudie (2013, particularly pp. 105–106) seems to, namely the ambiguous relation between the “self” on the irreflective level and the “ego” on the reflective. To summarize my understanding: on the ir- or pre-reflective level consciousness is always consciousness of something (chair, image, ego, truth) while at the same time only ever having a completely immediate and immanent—in short an utterly implicit—form of “self-consciousness.” This latter conscience (de) soi is always coupled with the former conscience de…, namely consciousness of something I am not (chair, image, etc.) In fact, this is the precise dynamic that allows consciousness to forever be conscious of things it is not, while also not (exception: pure reflection) being conscious of what it actually is (pure spontaneity, nothingness, translucency). Such immanent selfness remains completely unthematized until reflection comes about, which is precisely the act of consciousness that transforms—and if impure, “degrades”—this pure unthematizable self into an object for reflective consciousness, namely an “I” or “me”—in short the ego. These points should become even clearer as we proceed.

  21. The “of” is bracketed by Sartre (in Being and Nothingness) because although he wants to adhere to the rules of grammar, “consciousness (of) self” is not intentional, in that such awareness is absolutely immediate and immanent—is not “posited” or “thematized.”

  22. cf. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 7/98).

  23. ibid., pp. 7/97. Translation modified—«Elle constitue […] une totalité synthétique et individuelle entièrement isolée des autres totalités de même type et le Je ne peut être évidemment qu’une expression (et non une condition) de cette incommunicabilité et de cette intériorité des consciences».

  24. ibid.

  25. ibid., pp. 7/98.

  26. ibid., pp. 8/98.

  27. ibid., pp. 13/102.

  28. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 173/186).

  29. Imagine a more basic animal that is more glued to its desires and appetites, and has little other forms of consciousness other than sensuous perception—here it is possible to conceive of a consciousness with little or no reflection.

  30. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 16/104).

  31. ibid., pp. 15/103.

  32. ibid., pp. 15/104.

  33. cf. ibid., pp. 17/104.

  34. ibid., pp. 18/105.

  35. ibid.

  36. ibid.

  37. ibid.

  38. ibid.

  39. ibid., pp. 18/106.

  40. ibid., pp. 20/107.

  41. ibid.

  42. cf. ibid.

  43. cf. ibid., pp. 21/108.

  44. ibid.

  45. ibid., pp. 22/108–109.

  46. ibid., pp. 23/110.

  47. ibid., pp. 24/110.

  48. ibid., pp. 23/110.

  49. ibid., pp. 23/109.

  50. cf. ibid., pp. 24–25/110–111.

  51. ibid., pp. 47/128.

  52. ibid., pp. 25/110–111.

  53. Such laws, moreover, are triggered by the immediate capacity for perceiving; but they also always go beyond perception by stating more than was actually witnessed. Note, therefore, how Sartrean theory also can account for Hume’s “problem of induction”—cf. Hume (2001, particularly Book I Part 3; as well as 2007, particularly sections 4, 5, and 7).

  54. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 25/111).

  55. ibid., pp. 26/112.

  56. ibid., pp. 26/112.

  57. ibid.

  58. ibid.

  59. ibid.

  60. ibid.

  61. ibid.

  62. ibid., pp. 26–27/112.

  63. ibid., pp. 27/112.

  64. ibid.

  65. cf. ibid.

  66. ibid.

  67. cf. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 27/112–113).

  68. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 27/113).

  69. ibid.

  70. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 28/113).

  71. ibid.

  72. cf. ibid.

  73. ibid.

  74. ibid., pp. 30/115.

  75. This conception of the ego is always primary for Sartre, and can therefore stand alone, although it can also lead to a ‘synthetic enrichment’ (ibid., pp. 28/114), which is apparent in a ‘psycho-physical me’ (ibid.).

  76. ibid., pp. 32/116.

  77. ibid.

  78. cf. ibid., pp. 33/117. Therefore, the ego is totally opaque and can only be grasped through actions, states, and qualities. Basic selfness, on the contrary, is totally translucent and can only be grasped through pure, momentary reflection.

  79. ibid.

  80. ibid.

  81. cf. ibid., pp. 33/118.

  82. ibid., pp. 33–34/118.

  83. ibid., pp. 33/117.

  84. ibid., pp. 34–35/118–119. Translation modified—«l’Ego est un objet appréhendé mais aussi constitué par la conscience réflexive. C’est un foyer virtuel d’unité, et la conscience le constitue en sens inverse de celui que suit la production réelle: ce qui est premier réellement, ce sont les consciences, à travers lesquelles se constituent les états, puis, à travers ceux-ci, l’Ego. Mais, comme l’ordre est renversé par une conscience qui s’emprisonne dans le Monde pour se fuir, les consciences sont données comme émanant des états et les états comme produits par l’Ego. Il s’ensuit que la conscience projette sa propre spontanéité dans l’objet Ego pour lui conférer le pouvoir créateur qui lui est absolument nécessaire. Seulement cette spontanéité, représentée et hypostasiée dans un objet, devient une spontanéité bâtarde et dégradée, qui conserve magiquement sa puissance créatrice tout en devenant passive. D’où l’irrationalité profonde de la notion d’Ego».

  85. ibid., pp. 35/119.

  86. cf. ibid.

  87. ibid.

  88. ibid., pp. 36/119.

  89. ibid. Translation modified – « spontanéité fantomale ».

  90. cf. ibid., pp. 35/119.

  91. ibid., pp. 36/119.

  92. ibid.

  93. cf. ibid., pp. 33/117.

  94. My attention has been drawn to this problem through comments made by R. Visker.

  95. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 284/299).

  96. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 40/122–123).

  97. cf. ibid., pp. 40/123.

  98. cf. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 284/299–300).

  99. This addition is thanks to one of the anonymous referees.

  100. cf. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 281/297).

  101. cf. ibid., pp. 32, 45/42, 56–57.

  102. ibid., pp. 245/259.

  103. Such “media” always distort such spontaneity—or even its manifestation—to the point of it being unrecognizable. Think of how one’s face is reversed in a mirror image; or how one’s voice “sounds weird” on an answering machine; etc.

  104. «–Mais, monsieur, en admettant qu’il paraisse ce que vous dites, comment pouvez-vous juger cet homme sur sa mine ? Un visage, monsieur, ne dit rien quand il est au repos.

    Aveugles humanistes ! Ce visage est si parlant, si net–mais jamais leur âme tendre et abstraite ne s’est laissé toucher par le sens d’un visage.»—Sartre (2011, p. 172).

  105. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 46/127).

  106. These comments are thanks to R. Breeur.

  107. cf. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 82–83/94–95).

  108. cf. ibid., pp. 78–79/89–91.

  109. I have a suspicion that such bad faith extremes, merged with fantastical flights and moods of the imaginary, as well as an over- or under-preponderance of the look, would be three of the chief factors to consider when evaluating the personalities of many neurotics and psychotics.

  110. cf. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 43–44/125–126).

  111. Indeed, for Sartre language is “sacred” for the agent and “magical” for the patient [cf. Sartre (2005/2012, pp. 396/414)]. “Sacred” means that when I speak or do something, what I say or do is picked up by others in a way that transcends my grasp; how the other may interpret my words, gestures, or movements; or what precise influence they might have on him or her is beyond me, at least in part. Someone else’s language, on the other hand, is “magical” to me because I never can truly predict what will be said or done; the other is always completely free to surprise me in what they do or say (and I them). Thus language as conversation is precisely a matching up of such “sacredness” and “magic.”

  112. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 36/120).

  113. cf. ibid.

  114. cf. ibid.

  115. ibid., pp. 37/120.

  116. ibid., pp. 39/122.

  117. Sartre (2004/2003, pp. 38/121).

  118. ibid.

  119. Again thanks to R. Breeur.

  120. This point was brought to my attention through a friend of mine, A. Rītups.

  121. Sartre calls these latter the ‘two authentic attitudes’ (2005/2012, pp. 314/330) with regard to the look. Here, “authentic” must not be taken in any moral or Heideggerian sense (cf. ibid., pp. 552/575); on the contrary it is “authentic” because the above passage concerns the only real possibilities in the ontological structure of the look, wherein subjectivity (“looking”) and objectivity (“being-looked-at”) necessarily exclude one another. This does not mean (as I have tried to show) that this is always the case on a more everyday, interpersonal level, where, I suggest, these extremes are to be avoided when possible—cf. also ibid., pp. 81/92.

  122. To fill this out further, we would need to look more closely at what Sartre means by “emotion” (which has been a vital but unanalysed factor throughout); as well as at a not-so-obvious role for the imaginary.

References

Primary Sources

  • Sartre, Jean-Paul. [1936] 2004/2003. The transcendence of the Ego (trans. Sarah Richmond). London and New York: Routledge./‘La transcendance de l’Ego.’ In La Transcendance de l’Ego et autres textes phénoménologiques (ed. V. de Coorebyter). Librarie Philosophique J. VRIN.

  • Sartre, Jean-Paul. [1943] 2005/2012. Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (trans. Hazel E. Barnes). London: Routledge./L’être et le néant. Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique. Paris : Éditions Gallimard.

Secondary Sources

  • Hume, David. [1739–1740] 2001. A treatise of human nature. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Hume, David. [1748] 2007. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and other writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Rinaudie, Pierre-Jean. 2013. ‘Me, myself and I: Sartre and Husserl on elusiveness of the self.’ In Continental Philosophy Review 46, pp. 99–113.doi:10.1007/s11007-013-9243-3.

  • Sartre, Jean-Paul. [1938] 2011. La Nausée. Paris : Éditions Gallimard.

  • Van der Wielen, Julie. 2014. The magic of the other: Sartre on the look in ontology and experience. In Sartre Studies International 20(2), pp. 58–75. doi:10.3167/ssi.2015.200205.

  • Visker, Rudi. 1999. ‘The Gaze of the Big Other. Levinas and Sartre on Racism.’ In Truth and Singularity. Taking Foucault into Phenomenology. Phaenomenologica 175. Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 326–356.

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Acknowledgments

The aforementioned article by J. Van der Wielen helped me greatly in understanding an important distinction at work in this piece. I also received very helpful comments and feedback from both my promoters, R. Breeur and R. Visker, as well as from one anonymous referee. The focus required to carry out such a project is also only possible thanks to the funding provided by the Research Foundation, Flanders (FWO).

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  1. Husserl Archives: Centre for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy, and the Research Foundation, Flanders (FWO), Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000, Leuven, Belgium

    Daniel O’Shiel

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O’Shiel, D. Public egos: constructing a Sartrean theory of (inter)personal relations. Cont Philos Rev 48, 273–296 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9334-4

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