Abstract
Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga’s intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen’s and Plantinga’s intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.
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Otte, R. Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability. Synthese 152, 81–93 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-1332-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-1332-3