Abstract
According to the predominant view within contemporary philosophy of psychiatry, mental disorders involve essentially personal and societal values, and thus, the concept of mental disorder cannot, even in principle, be elucidated in a thoroughly objective manner. Several arguments have been adduced in support of this impossibility thesis. My critical examination of two master arguments advanced to this effect by Derek Bolton and Jerome Wakefield, respectively, raises serious doubts about their soundness. Furthermore, I articulate an alternative, thoroughly objective, though in part normative, framework for the elucidation of the concept of mental disorder. The concepts of mental dysfunction and impairment of basic psychological capacities to satisfy one’s basic needs are the building blocks of this framework. I provide an argument for the objective harmfulness of genuine mental disorders as patterns of mental dysfunctions with objectively negative biotic values, as well as a formally correct definition of the concept of mental disorder. Contrary to the received view, this objective framework allows for the possibility of genuine mental disorders due to adverse social conditions, as well as for quasi-universal mental disorders. I conclude that overall, the project of providing an objective account of the concept of mental disorder is far from impossible, and moreover, that it is, at least in principle, feasible.
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Notes
For a detailed book-length exposition of his views, see [1].
The title of his book is What is mental disorder? not “How is mental disorder recognized or diagnosed?”
For a similar objective, though in part also normative, account of the concept of health, see [10].
For a formally rigorous elucidation of the concept of biotic value, see [11, pp. 158–160].
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Oulis, P. On the nature of mental disorder: towards an objectivist account. Theor Med Bioeth 33, 343–357 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-012-9224-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-012-9224-2