Notes
Noteworthy exceptions are the sensibility theories of John McDowell and David Wiggins. For a nice overview of the distinction between contemporary continuity and discontinuity theories see Darwall (1997).
It is worth noting that Drummond does not deny the possibility of failing to see the other as worthy of respect due to dissimilarity, “as the literature of the invisibility of blacks, of Indians to their British lords, of women in largely male meetings testifies” (Drummond 2006, p. 22). But because of his use of Husserl, Smith denies Drummond any recourse to Drummond’s own account of the criticizability of such failures.
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Ozar, A.C. Smith, William Hosmer: The Phenomenology of Moral Normativity . Husserl Stud 32, 67–73 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-015-9184-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-015-9184-2