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Bare Particulars, Modes, and the Varieties of Dependence

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Abstract

Within some ontological theories, bare or thin particulars are the “kernel” of ordinary substances and they are supposed to clarify some key features of the latter, including their nature. In this article, I wish to offer a new theory of bare particulars, based on an interpretation of properties as modes and on a new reading of the dependence relations holding among entities in terms of respects of dependence. In Sect. 1, I shall introduce bare particulars, modes and respects of dependence. In Sect. 2, I shall consider the relationships between bare particulars, clothed particulars (i.e., ordinary substances) and their properties. I shall present two models and I shall examine some of their problems. In Sects. 3 and 4, I shall present a new model by invoking modes and respects of dependence. This will ground my theory of the relationships between bare particulars, clothed particulars and their properties. Finally, in Sect. 5, I shall compare my model with the second model presented in Sect. 2 and, in Sect. 6, I shall deal with some objections against bare particulars and against my own theory.

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Notes

  1. See Robinson (2018).

  2. These classically include Allaire (1963), Bergmann (1967), Armstrong (1978) and Moreland (1998). See also Alston (1954). Bare particulars need to be distinguished from haecceities, i.e., non-qualitative properties that only characterize individual entities, such as the property of being identical with Socrates (see Rosenkrantz 1993). Extensive criticisms of bare particulars have been presented by Loux (1978) and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994).

  3. Although most bare particular theorists hold that bare particulars compose clothed particulars, I am inclined to believe that no composition relation actually holds between them, as I shall show in Sect. 3.

  4. As we shall see in Sect. 2, this allows for something that is not strongly simple (i.e., prime matter) to play the role of bare particulars in Brower (2014)’s theory.

  5. See again Koons and Pickavance (2017).

  6. For more details on the distinction between external and internal relations, see MacBride (2020) and Paolini Paoletti (2016) and (manuscript). This definition unifies two distinct traditions. First, it is in line with Moore (1919), Ryle (1935), Armstrong (1997) and Mulligan (1998) in holding that internal relations (i.e., relations that are not external) are ‘fixed’ by the existence of their relata. Since relata ‘fix’ internal relations by virtue of their existing as the very entities they are, they ‘fix’ such relations in virtue of their essences. Secondly, my definition is also in line with Armstrong (1978) and Lewis (1986, 62) in holding that internal relations are ‘fixed’ by the intrinsic properties of their relata, i.e., those properties that are had by their relata independently of anything else. These traditions are unified by pointing out that, in both cases, internal relations do not add anything ‘new’ with respect to their relata, that they are ‘reducible’ to the latter. On the contrary, external relations are not ‘reducible’ to their relata. Accordingly, in order to make sense of this idea, I also invoke ‘entire dependence’ instead of ‘necessitation’. For in principle a relation may be necessitated by its relata. Yet, if that relation were also essential to its relata, it would not be ‘reducible’ to the latter. For an extensive discussion, see Paolini Paoletti (manuscript).

  7. This characterization of essences rules out two troublesome circumstances. First, that the essence of A includes something that has nothing to do with A (e.g., being such that 2 + 2 = 4 in the essence of bare Socrates or of clothed Socrates). Secondly, that the essence of A includes something that derives from something else that is already included in the essence of A (e.g., being able to laugh in the essence of clothed Socrates, that seems to derive from his being a human, i.e., a rational animal). I assume here that every entity has an essence. Moreover, essences need not be entities in addition to their ‘bearers’. For example, the essence of Socrates’ need not be a property that is ‘borne’ by Socrates. It may be identical with Socrates or it may just be a proposition stating what Socrates non-derivatively is in every possible circumstance. See also Fine (1994a, 1994b).

  8. See Marshall and Weatherson (2018).

  9. Or, alternatively, two distinct relations between Socrates and exemplification and between exemplification and being a philosopher.

  10. I follow Vallicella (2002) in presenting Bradley’s regress as an explanatory regress. See also Maurin (2012) and Paolini Paoletti (2016).

  11. For a different view, see Sider (2006).

  12. For an in-depth discussion of the roles played by and of the theories accounting for bare particulars, see Perovic (2017).

  13. See, for example, Heil (2003, 2012) and Lowe (2006).

  14. See Paolini Paoletti (2016). In principle, one could also distinguish between a monadic mode only ‘borne’ by Romeo (i.e., Romeo’s being taller than Juliet) and the relational mode ‘borne’ by both Romeo and Juliet (i.e., Romeo’s and Juliet’s together being such that Romeo is taller than Juliet). However, in Paolini Paoletti (2021), I argue that there only exist the latter relational modes.

  15. In my characterization, identity-dependence takes together both the sortal/kind to which an entity belongs and its individuation conditions. See also Tahko and Lowe (2020) for alternative readings.

  16. Additionally, and for example, when it comes to existence-dependence (i.e., A depends for its existence on B), two main options are available. First, one could deny that there is such a primitive and sui generis dependence relation, so that whenever A seems to existentially depend on B, such a dependence fact may be accounted for through further dependence relations (e.g., identity-dependence or origin- and/or sustenance-dependence) or through certain facts (e.g., if one accepts concrete possible worlds and holds that existence-dependence is a necessity-entailing relation, that A exists in all and only the possible worlds where also B exists). Alternatively, one could claim that existence-dependence is a primitive and sui generis dependence relation. I remain agnostic here on the possibility of reducing specific dependence relations such as existence-dependence.

  17. If something non-permanently depends on something else, then it is possible that the former does not depend on the latter, so that it is not necessary that the former depends on the latter.

  18. Why cannot ROLE1 just be a property had by distinct entities at distinct times and possible worlds? In Paolini Paoletti (2019), I argued as follows. If ROLE1 were a particular property (i.e., a trope or a mode), then nothing would guarantee that at distinct times/in distinct possible worlds/with distinct ‘players’, ROLE1 would remain the same entity. Namely, nothing would guarantee that A still RD-depends on the same ROLE1. If ROLE1 were a universal property, it would either be able to exist uninstantiated (i.e., it would be a Platonic universal), or not (i.e., it would be an Aristotelian universal). If it were a Platonic universal, ROLE1 would be able to exist also at those times/in those possible worlds at/in which it is not the case that A RD-depends on ROLE1. Thus, something else in addition to A, RD-dependence and ROLE1 would be required in order to make up the latter fact. But nothing else should be required, since A’s RD-depending on ROLE1 is just made up of A, RD-dependence and ROLE1. If ROLE1 were an Aristotelian universal, it would still be able to exist also at those times/in those possible worlds at/in which A does not exist. For nothing would tie ROLE1 only to A. Thus, in at least some cases, ROLE1 would not be able to determine A, i.e., to necessitate the existence of A. And this determination/necessitation aspect seems to be required by at least some RD-relations.

  19. “Part” and “constituent”—when used with essences—are used only figuratively.

  20. On this problem, see Bailey (2012). Following a strategy similar to that pursued by Pickavance, Wildman (2015) tries to solve the reduplication problem by distinguishing between two instantiation relations: possessing—that holds between clothed particulars and properties—and bearing—that holds between bare particulars and properties. Possessing is linked to bearing, as clothed particulars are taken to possess their properties by being constituted by bare particulars bearing them. Whenever a property P (e.g., being human) is possessed by a clothed particular (e.g., clothed Socrates), there is a bare particular (e.g., bare Socrates) that constitutes the relevant clothed particular and that bears P. More importantly, since two distinct instantiation relations are involved, there are not two distinct instances of the same property. Or, more precisely, using the example of humanity, there are not two distinct entities—i.e., clothed Socrates and bare Socrates—that are human in the same way, so that there are not two distinct human beings. My suspicion is that, if we followed this path, introducing two distinct instantiation relations would look like an ad hoc move to save bare particulars. For it seems to me that we would not have independent reasons (i.e., reasons independent from the acceptance of bare particulars) for holding that there is more than one instantiation relation in the universe. In Sect. 4 I shall re-examine this strategy within my framework. I shall introduce modes, identity-dependence and essences in order to make sense of the distinction between havingI and havingE. Since we may have independent reasons for accepting modes, identity-dependence and essences, my move will not look like an ad hoc one.

  21. Pickavance (2014) presents some difficulties that may also affect Brower’s model. But I shall not dwell on them here.

  22. I assume that natural kinds are sui generis properties or entities analogous to properties.

  23. If it is possible to partly identity-depend on something else without entirely identity-depending on the latter plus further entities—as it happens in this case—we should redefine the distinction between partial and entire dependence provided in Sect. 1. I shall not attend to this task here—though see Paolini Paoletti (forthcoming). This possibility is in line with Leuenberger (2020)’s treatment of partial grounding.

  24. In Sect. 4 I shall clarify the distinction between havingI/beingI and havingE/beingE from the standpoint of my theory.

  25. Moreover, talking of “parts” or “constituents” of essences—as we have already seen—is only a figurative way of talking of essences, that implies no real composition in the latter.

  26. See Loux (1978) and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994).

  27. I shall deal with some objections against this idea in Sect. 6.

  28. More on my treatment of Bradley’s regress in Paolini Paoletti (2016).

  29. On some features of prime matter, see Brower (2014, 19–21).

  30. With respect to immaterial substances, I am not only thinking of angels, but also of abstract objects such as numbers. Numbers may be thought of as clothed particulars identity-depending on some kind universal (e.g., being a number) and on distinct bare particulars (e.g., that of number 2, that of number 3, and so on). But I shall not defend this idea here.

  31. Mertz raises another difficulty: bare particulars, being nature-less, cannot be distinct from one another. I have implicitly replied to this objection by denying that the bareness of bare particulars implies the absence of an essence/nature and by claiming that they enjoy primitive individuality. Also Moreland and Pickavance (2003) reply to Mertz. To them, Mertz (2003) offers a counter-reply.

  32. Individuating clothed Socrates would be ‘just akin’ to a proprium, as propria only follow from the essences of the relevant entities—though not being part of the latter—and they can characterize types or subtypes of entities sharing the same essences, rather than individual entities.

  33. The interpretation is controversial. See for example Edwards (1985).

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to one reviewer for her helpful comments, that greatly contributed to improving this work.

Funding

This study received financial support from the Italian “Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca”, as part of the PRIN-2017 Project “The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image” (prot. n. 2017ZNWW7F).

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    Michele Paolini Paoletti

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Paolini Paoletti , M. Bare Particulars, Modes, and the Varieties of Dependence. Erkenn 88, 1593–1620 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00417-6

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