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The Ambiguity of Quantifiers

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Abstract

In the tradition of substructural logics, it has been claimed for a long time that conjunction and inclusive disjunction are ambiguous:we should, in fact, distinguish between ‘lattice’ connectives (also called additive or extensional) and ‘group’ connectives (also called multiplicative or intensional). We argue that an analogous ambiguity affects the quantifiers. Moreover, we show how such a perspective could yield solutions for two well-known logical puzzles: McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens and the lottery paradox.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Scienze Pedagogiche e Filosofiche, Universitá di Cagliari, Via Is Mirrionis 1, 09123, Cagliari, Italy

    Francesco Paoli

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  1. Francesco Paoli
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Correspondence to Francesco Paoli.

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Paoli, F. The Ambiguity of Quantifiers. Philos Stud 124, 313–330 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-7777-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-7777-x

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