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Philosophical skepticism not relativism is the problem with the Strong Programme in Science Studies and with Educational Constructivism

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Abstract

The structure of David’s Bloor argument for the Strong Programme (SP) in Science Studies is criticized from the philosophical perspective of anti-skeptical, scientific realism. The paper transforms the common criticism of SP—that the symmetry principle of SP implies an untenable form of cognitive relativism—into the␣clear philosophical issue of naturalism versus Platonism. It is also argued that the concrete patterns of SP’s interest-explanations and its sociological definition of knowledge involve philosophical skepticism. It is claimed, then, that the most problematic elements of SP reside primarily in philosophical skepticism. It is also claimed that this sort of criticism can be directed against other more radical, versions of constructivism in science and science education studies.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Aristides Baltas, Stathis Psillos, Theodore Arabatzis, Spyros Petrounakos, Lara Scurla, Andreas Karitzis, Maria Rentetzi, Vasso Kindi and Kostas Gavroglu for their invaluable and detailed comments that helped me to shape the content of this essay and to avoid some of its shortcomings. For the same reason, I thank the three anonymous reviewers for Science & Education. I would like also to thank Kostas Pagondiotis, Angelos Elefantis, Aris Arageorgis, Giorgos Fourtounis, Kostas Stergiopoulos, Stelios Virvidakis, Michalis Assimakopoulos, Dionysios Anapolitanos, Peter Machamer, Ted McQuire and Laura Reutsche for their thought-provoking remarks and teachings found their way in many points that are raised in this piece. Previous versions of parts of this paper were read in workshops and conferences held in Xanthi, Istanbul (Boğaziçi University) and Athens. Thanks the participants for their critical comments. This paper would be inexistent without the encouragement and help by Michael Matthews and Constantine Skordoulis. Thanks to both.

Research for this project is co-funded by the European Social Fund and National Resources – (EPEAEK II) PYTHAGORAS II.

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  1. Department of History and Philosophy of Science - University of Athens, National Technical University of Athens, Athens, 10683, Greece

    Dimitris P. Papayannakos

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Papayannakos, D.P. Philosophical skepticism not relativism is the problem with the Strong Programme in Science Studies and with Educational Constructivism. Sci & Educ 17, 573–611 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-006-9061-7

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