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Halverson’s non-equivalent concepts of equivalence

Hans Halvorson: The logic in philosophy of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, xiii +296 pp, £26.99 PB

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References

  • Halvorson, H. 2012. What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. Philosophy of Science 79: 183–206.

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  • Lawvere, F.W., and R. Rosebrugh. 2003. Sets for Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Lawvere, F.W., and S. Schanuel. 1997. Conceptual Mathematics: A First Introduction to Categories, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • van Fraassen, B. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  1. Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies, Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan, Republic of Kazakhstan

    T. Parent

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Parent, T. Halverson’s non-equivalent concepts of equivalence. Metascience 30, 99–102 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-021-00606-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-021-00606-7

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