Abstract
The paper is devoted to the problem of formal representation of prescriptive obligation, i.e., the obligation concerning the way in which an action is to be performed. Improper representation of prescriptive obligation leads to Forrester's Paradox. In the paper I first present a new version of Forrester's Paradox that generalizes the observation on which the original version is based. Then I challenge the two existing solutions to the paradox. I reject the solution of H.-N. Castañeda and analyze problems to which the solution of W. Sinnott-Armstrong leads. I conclude the paper with a proposal for how to improve Sinnott-Armstrong's solution.
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References
Castañeda H.-N.: 1985, ‘Aspectual Actions, the Deepest Paradox of Deontic Logic, and Davidsonian Events’, in E. LePore (ed.), Companion to Actions and Events, Oxford University Press, New York.
Castañeda H.-N.: 1986, ‘Obligations, Aspectual Actions and Circumstances’, Philosophical Papers 15, 155–170.
Forrester J.: 1984, ‘Gentle Murder, or the Adverbial Samaritan’, The Journal of Philosophy 81, 193–197.
Sinnott-Armstrong W.: 1985, ‘A Solution to Forrester's Paradox of Gentle Murder’, The Journal of Philosophy 82, 162–168.
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Pasek, J. Prescriptive obligation and Forrester's Paradox. Erkenntnis 37, 99–114 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00220635
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00220635